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SHORT ABSTRACT
This Article describes Minnesota's civil commitment program
for sex offenders, which has never successfully fully discharged
anyone in over twenty years. This program is then compared to
similar programs in Wisconsin and New York, which successfully
divert and release sex offenders on a regular basis. Given the
similar geographic and demographic makeup of Minnesota and
Wisconsin, one would expect that the number of individuals
committed to, and released from, each state's sex offender
commitment program would be comparable. But there are
significant differences between the number of individuals who are
civilly committed and remain civilly committed in Minnesota versus
Wisconsin. Likewise, New York-although perhaps not as close a
demographic match with Minnesota-enjoys much greater success
at diversion and reintegration than Minnesota.
This Article next examines the civil commitment statutes in
Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin in an effort to answer the
question of why Minnesota has such a disparity in the number of
civilly committed sex offenders compared to the other states. To do
so, it compares the commitment process, the discharge process, the
relevant case law, and the outcomes of the programs themselves.
Finally, this Article reflects on what Minnesota can learn from
Wisconsin and New York and how changes in its program could put
Minnesota on a path towards a working sex offender commitment
program that would track the success of Wisconsin and New York.
I. BACKGROUND
Minnesota is one of twenty states that have civil commitment
programs for sex offenders.' In a 2013 survey conducted by the Sex
Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network (SOCCPN), of the
eighteen programs that participated in the survey, Minnesota had
the highest number of civilly committed individuals in inpatient
2treatment. According to this recent survey, Minnesota commits
130.2 sex offenders per million people, whereas the next highest
1. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX
OFFENDERS EVALUATION REPORT 18 (2011) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR
REPORT].
2. See DEIRDRE D'ORAZIO ET AL., SOCCPN, SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX
OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 2013, at 5, available at http://www.soccpn
.org/images/SOCCPN-survey-presentation_2013_in-pdf.pdf.
[Vol. 41:3
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respondent state, Kansas, commits only 84.6 sex offenders per
3
million people. Wisconsin, which arguably is almost identical to
Minnesota in its demographic and geographic makeup, commits
only 55.3 sex offenders per million people and New York has one
of the lowest commitment ratios at 13.9 sex offenders committed
per million people.4 In 2011, the Office of the Legislative Auditor
of the State of Minnesota found that Minnesota had about four
times as many civilly committed sex offenders per capita as the
average for the other nineteen states with civil commitment
5
programs.
A. Historical Background of Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment
Statute
Minnesota's civil commitment statute for dangerous sex
offenders was first enacted in 1939 and was referred to as the
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.6 That law, although rarely
used, "was seen as an alternative to the criminal justice system for
those who were 'too sick' to be punished."' In adopting the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, the
United States Supreme Court found that the statute was
intended to include those persons who, by a habitual
course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced
an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses
and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict
injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.8
In 1989, following a number of highly publicized and
horrendous crimes involving sexual assaults by recent parolees, a
task force convened by the Minnesota Attorney General
"recommended the resuscitation of sex offender commitments in
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id.
5. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
6. Warren J. Maas, Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment of Sex
Offenders, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1241, 1241-42, 1247 (2003).
7. Eric S. Janus, Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an
Empirically-Based Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1083,
1088 (2003).
8. Maas, supra note 6, at 1242 (quoting Minnesota ex Tel. Pearson v. Probate
Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 273 (1940)).
2015]
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Minnesota."" The task force suggested that the Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute could be used to effectively extend criminal
sentences by adding civil commitment to the sentences of "those
sex offenders who were 'too dangerous' to be released from
prison."'
Government attorneys began using the statute to commit sex
offenders at the end of their criminal sentences, and in turn,
litigation was brought challenging the constitutionality of these
commitments. In 1994, a civilly committed offender successfully
challenged his commitment because the record failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the individual had an utter lack
of power to control his sexual impulses since his commitment was
based upon evidence showing that the offender had planned out
an attack." This decision jeopardized the post-conviction sex
offender commitment option. In response, the Minnesota
Legislature immediately called a special session and-without the
normal legislative process associated with such important
legislation-passed the Sexually Dangerous Person statute, which
did not require proof of an "utter lack of power to control sexual
impulses." That amendment created the Sexually Dangerous
Person (SDP) and the Sexually Psychopathic Personality (SPP)
categories under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act
in 1994."
By 2002, there was concern about the growing costs of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), and the fact that no
one had been fully released from the program since 1983.14 In
November 2002, the then-clinical director of the MSOP reported
that "about twenty-five percent of the committed men could be
9. Janus, supra note 7, at 1089; see also Maas, supra note 6, at 1241-42 (citing
Mama J. Johnson, Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality and Sexually Dangerous
Person Statute: Throwing Away the Key, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1139, 1148 (1996);
Julie A. Hoffman, Humphrey Asks [for] Tougher Sentences for Rapists, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS & DISPATCH, June 27, 1988, at A5).
10. Janus, supra note 7, at 1089.
11. See In reLinehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Minn. 1994) (quoting State ex
rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297,
302 (1939)).
12. Maas, supra note 6, at 1248-49.
13. Id.
14. See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora's Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of
Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1233, 1239-40 (2004).
[Vol. 41:3
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managed, with proper supervision, in the community." 15 In 2003,
the state began the process of identifying individuals whose
treatment needs had not been adequately met. 6 In a June 2003
article in the Star Tribune newspaper, mental health officials from
the Department of Human Services, which runs the MSOP, noted
that they "ha[d] succeeded in only part of their legal obligation:
protecting the public" and that it was "time ... to do a better job of
fulfilling their other legal obligation: giving sexual psychopaths in
their care individualized treatment in the least prison-like settings
possible."' 7 The article recognized that "[i]ndividualized treatment
might include half-way houses, other DHS programs, or long-term
and intensive supervision of offenders in the community." 1 MSOP
officials also noted that "the state has a legal obligation to provide
effective treatment [a]nd to be effective, treatment must include
the possibility of release."'
The issue then appeared to turn political. The Minnesota
Attorney General at the time criticized the State, commenting, "To
keep a few bucks in people's pockets, we are going to let sexual
predators out to harm people." In response, the then-Governor of
Minnesota issued an executive order, dated July 10, 2003, requiring
the State to ensure that "no person who has been civilly committed
under Minnesota law as a sexually dangerous person or as a person
with a sexual psychopathic personality is discharged into the
community unless required by law or ordered by a court., 2' The
then-Governor's chief of staff was quoted as saying, "The governor
doesn't want these guys to get out, and he's made that clear ever
since he was running for office."
22
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1240.
17. Josephine Marcotty, State Looks to Release Sexual Psychopaths; Is Concern for
Offenders, or the Lock-Up Program's High Cost, Driving Change?, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis),June 22, 2003, at IA.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Governor Tim Pawlenty, State of Minn., Exec. Order 03-10, Providing
Direction to State Agencies in Relation to Persons Civilly Committed Under
Minnesota Law as Having Sexual Psychopathic Personalities or as Sexually
Dangerous Persons (July 10, 2003), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive
/execorders/03-10.pdf.
22. Warren Wolfe, Sex Offender Release Rules Are Changed; Pawlenty's Executive
Order, in Effect, Will Keep Psychopaths Locked Up, Chief of Staff Says, STAR TRIB.
20151
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Shortly after these events, a young female college student, Dru
Sjodin, was kidnapped, brutally raped, and murdered by a recently-23
released Level 3 sex offender. The offender, Alfonso Rodriguez
Jr., had not been referred for civil commitment prior to his
24release. This horrific event fostered an immediate change in how
individuals were referred for civil commitment in Minnesota. Dre
Wrigley, who at the time was the U.S. Attorney for North Dakota
and lead prosecutor in the Sjodin case that followed the murder,
noted that the public outrage helped to change the way sex
offenders are perceived-"It set in place a very broad-based and
firm public consensus about the danger posed by sex offenders.
25
This sentiment was echoed by Thomas Heffelfinger, who served as
the U.S. Attorney for Minnesota while working with Wrigley on the
case. 26 Heffelfinger noted that he "saw a rapid shift after Sjodin's
murder in public and official sentiment over how to deal with high-
risk sex offenders. The focus really was on getting knowledge and
information out to people and keeping sex offenders locked up
through civil commitment.
'2 7
In December 2003, immediately following the murder of
Sjodin, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (MNDOC) made
an additional 236 wholesale referrals for civil commitment of sex
offenders "after an extensive review of sex offenders either
incarcerated in prison or living in the community after release
from prison. ''28 Approximately thirty-one percent of those
individuals were committed.29
After 2003, the MNDOC implemented a different process for
determining whether an individual should be referred to the
county attorney as a candidate for a civil commitment petition.0
(Minneapolis),July 11, 2003, at lB.
23. Stephen J. Lee, 10 Years Later, Dru Sjodin's Kidnapping, Murder Changed
Law And Society, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Nov. 20, 2013, available at LEXIS;
Sjodin Case: Why Was Sex Offender Free?, ABC NEws (Dec. 2, 2003), http://abcnews
.go.com/GMA/story?id=128168. Level 3 is the designation for those sex offenders
at the highest risk of reoffending. Lee, supra.
24. Sjodin Case: Why Was Sex Offender Free?, supra note 23.
25. Lee, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 27-28 ("The pre-2003 review process involved a more informal
review by three staff. Beginning in 2004, the DOC review became more formalized
[Vol. 41:3
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This new process resulted in "a substantial increase in the number
of referrals."'" From 2004 through 2008, the MNDOC made about
157 referrals per year, approximately six times the referral rate
from the previous twelve years.32
Minnesota's current series of statutes relating to the civil
commitment of sex offenders is tided "Minnesota Commitment
and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and Sexual
Psychopathic Personalities," and can be found in Minnesota
Statutes sections 253D.01 to 253D.36.3
Under Minnesota's current laws, if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that an individual who has been petitioned for
commitment "is a sexually dangerous person or a person with a
sexual psychopathic personality, the court shall commit the person
to a secure treatment facility . . . for an indeterminate period of
time., 4 The Minnesota statute states that a
"[s]exual psychopathic personality" means the existence
in any person of such conditions of emotional instability,
or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary
standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the
consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of
these conditions, which render the person irresponsible
in terms of the criteria and process used to conduct the review. Under current
policies, the screening of each offender is done by a three-person team usually
consisting of a DOC psychologist, a correctional facility staff person, and a staff
person from DOC probation services. The review consists of three stages. At the
first stage, a computer program developed by the DOC eliminates offenders from
consideration based on their criminal history and other factors.... At the second
stage, the three-person screening committee reviews the files of offenders.... The
third stage of review consists of a more detailed review of offenders, including
interviews and the development of a report on each offender. At this stage of
review, independent legal counsel under contract to DOC reviews the
psychologist's report on each offender to see if the offender meets the legal
standard for referral to the county attorney. In addition, the Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections reviews the reports on those offenders who are
assigned a risk level of three but are not recommended for referral by the
screening committee or legal counsel. If the screening committee or legal counsel
recommends referral or if the [C]ommissioner determines referral is appropriate,
the department forwards the offender's name to the appropriate county attorney
for possible civil commitment.").
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id.
33. MINN. STAT. §§ 253D.01-.36 (2014).
34. Id. § 253D.07, subdivs. 3-4.
2015]
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for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the
person has evidenced, by habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the
person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to
35other persons.
. . . A "sexually dangerous person" is defined as a person
who: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct as defined in subdivision 8; (2) has manifested a
sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts
of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8 ....
For purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to prove
that the person has an inability to control the person's
sexual impulses."
Finally, "' [h] armful sexual conduct' means sexual conduct that
creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional
harm to another. ,31 It includes criminal sexual conduct in the first,
second, third, and fourth degrees, and other crimes where sexual
impulses were part of the crime or where the person's conduct had
criminal sexual conduct as a goal. It should be noted that
"Minnesota laws specifically allow for commitment for offenses that
involve emotional harm, as well as those involving physical harm or
violence," in contrast to most states (including Wisconsin and New
York), which "require a violent offense for civil commitment.
3 9
B. Historical Background of Wisconsin's Sex Offender Commitment
Statute
Wisconsin's involuntary civil commitment law for sex offenders
is entitled Sexually Violent Person Commitments and is found in
Wisconsin Statutes sections 980.01 to 980.14. 40 The law "was
enacted as 1993 Wisconsin Act 479 and took effect on June 2,
1994."
4
35. Id. § 253D.02, subdiv. 15.
36. Id. § 253D.02, subdiv. 16.
37. Id. § 253D.02, subdiv. 8.
38. Id.
39. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 20; see also N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 10.01(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014, chs. I to 550); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 980.02, subdiv. 2 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-.14 (Westlaw).
41. STATE OF Wis. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, SEX CRIMES AND PENALTIES IN
[Vol. 41:3
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Under Wisconsin's laws, if a person who is the subject of a
petition for commitment is determined to be a sexually violent
person, then the court shall order that person to be committed to
the Department of Health Services "for control, care, and
treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually
,,42
violent person. Under Wisconsin Statutes, a
"Is] exually violent person" means a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or
has been found not guilty of or not responsible for a
sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental
disease, defect, or illness, and who is dangerous because
he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
likely that the person will engage in one or more acts of
sexual violence."
Once an individual is committed as a sexually violent person,
the Wisconsin Department of Health Services places that individual
in either a "secure mental health facility established under
[section] 46.055, the Wisconsin resource center established under
[section] 46.056, or a secure mental health unit or facility provided
by the department of corrections under [subdivision] (2) [of
Wisconsin Statutes section 980.065] .
C. Historical Background of New York's Sex Offender Commitment
Statute
New York's civil management law, the Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA)," 5 "was passed by the
New York State Legislature and signed [into law] by Governor
Spitzer on April 13, 2007."46 The law "was enacted to protect the
WISCONSIN 1 (2001), available at http://Iegis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/ib/Olibl
.pdf.
42. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.06 (Westlaw).
43. Id. § 980.01(7) (Westlaw). "'Acts of sexual violence' means conduct that
constitutes the commission of a sexually violent offense." Id. § 980.01(lb)
(Westlaw).
44. Id. § 980.065 (Westlaw).
45. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-•17 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.
2014, chs. I to 550).
46. Frequently Ask Questions Regarding New York's Civil Management Law, N.Y.
ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som
faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
2015]
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public from sex offenders by creating a way to 'civilly manage'
offenders even after they have completed serving their time in
prison, or on parole. The law is designed to target those sex
offenders who suffer from a mental abnormality that involves a
predisposition to commit sex offenses, and who have an inability to
control their conduct.48 New York defines a "sex offender requiring
civil management" as "a detained sex offender' 9 who suffers from a
mental abnormality.
50
If an individual is found to be a sex offender qualifying for civil
management, there are two options. The individual may either be
placed on "'strict and intensive supervision and treatment,' [and]
live in the community" under the supervision of the Division of
Parole; or the individual may be found to be "a dangerous sex
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The statute provides the following definition:
"Detained sex offender" means a person who is in the care, custody,
control, or supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect to a
sex offense or designated felony, in that the person is either: (1) A
person who stands convicted of a sex offense as defined in subdivision
(p) of this section, and is currently serving a sentence for, or subject to
supervision by the division of parole, whether on parole or on post-
release supervision, for such offense or for a related offense; (2) A
person charged with a sex offense who has been determined to be an
incapacitated person with respect to that offense and has been
committed pursuant to article seven hundred thirty of the criminal
procedure law, but did engage in the conduct constituting such
offense; (3) A person charged with a sex offense who has been found
not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect for the
commission of that offense; (4) A person who stands convicted of a
designated felony that was sexually motivated and committed prior to
the effective date of this article; (5) A person convicted of a sex offense
who is, or was at any time after September first, two thousand five, a
patient in a hospital operated by the office of mental health, and who
was admitted directly to such facility pursuant to article nine of this
title or section four hundred two of the correction law upon release or
conditional release from a correctional facility, provided that the
provisions of this article shall not be deemed to shorten or lengthen
the time for which such person may be held pursuant to such article or
section respectively; or (6) A person who has been determined to be a
sex offender requiring civil management pursuant to this article.
MENTAL HYG. § 10. 0 3(g) (Westlaw).
50. Id. § 10.03(q) (Westlaw).
[Vol. 41:3
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offender requiring confinement" and will be "civilly confined in a
psychiatric facility run by the Office of Mental Health.
5
1
II. COMPARISON OF STATUTES
A. Referral and Decision to File Petition for Commitment
1. Minnesota's Process for Referrals and Decisions to File Petition for
Commitment
a. Referrals For Possible Civil Commitment
In Minnesota, the decision on whether to petition for civil
commitment of a sex offender lies with the elected county
attorneys. 2  "Since 1991, the [Minnesota] Department of
Corrections (MNDOC) has assisted county attorneys by evaluating
sex offenders who are scheduled to be released from prison" and
forwarding the names of individuals who MNDOC "believes meet
the commitment standard to county attorneys for their
consideration.' ' 5' From 1991 to December 2003, there were
approximately twenty-six referrals per year from the MNDOC to
the county attorneys and "[a]bout 61 percent of the referred
offenders were committed., 54  As noted above, after the
disappearance and murder of Dru Sjodin in December 2003,
MNDOC made an additional 236 referrals for civil commitment of
55
sex offenders. This was an increase of more than seventy percent
51. Frequently Ask Questions Regarding New York's Civil Management Law, supra
note 46; see also MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(q) (Westlaw). A "[s]ex offender requiring
strict and intensive supervision" is defined as "a detained sex offender who suffers
from a mental abnormality but is not a dangerous sex offender requiring
confinement." Id. § 10.03(r) (Westlaw). A "[d]angerous sex offender requiring
confinement" is defined as
a person who is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental
abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex
offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that the person is
likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not
confined to a secure treatment facility.
Id. § 10.03(e) (Westlaw).
52. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 1 (2014).
53. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
54. Id. at 27.
55. Compare id. (discussing the twenty-six referrals per year during the
thirteen year period of 1991 through 2003), with supra text accompanying note 28
2015]
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from the referrals that were made in the nearly thirteen previous56
years. Approximately thirty-one percent of those individuals
referred that month were ultimately committed. 7 At that time,
MNDOC implemented a new process for determining whether an
individual should be referred to the county attorney as a candidate
for a civil commitment petition, resulting in a substantial increase
in the number of referrals. 5
b. Decisions to Petition for Civil Commitment
A petition to civilly commit a sex offender may be filed by the
county attorney from the county in which the offender is living, or
if the offender is incarcerated, the county in which the conviction
was entered.59 The county attorney must be satisfied that good• 60
cause exists in order to file the petition. Leaving the decision on
whether to petition for civil commitment to the discretion of the
various county attorneys, in a decentralized manner, appears to
result in large variations by county in the commitments per capita.
61
2. Wisconsin's Process for Referrals and Decisions to File Petition for
Commitment
a. Referrals for Possible Civil Commitment
In Wisconsin, a state agency that has jurisdiction over a
"person who may meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually
violent person. .. [must] inform each appropriate district attorney
(detailing the spike in referrals after Sjodin's disappearance and murder by a
recently released Level 3 sex offender).
56. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 27-28 ("Under current policies, the screening of each offender is
done by a three-person team usually consisting of a [MN]DOC psychologist, a
correctional facility staff person, and a staff person from DOC probation services.
Their review consists of three stages .... About 13 percent of screened offenders
were referred to county attorneys for possible commitment.").
59. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; id. at 47 ("The
Legislature has authorized the Supreme Court to create a centralized court for
processing commitment cases, but the court has not created one."); see also MINN.
STAT. § 253D.11, subdiv. 1 (2014).
60. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 1; see also LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT,
supra note 1, at 30.
61. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-42.
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and the [Wisconsin] [D]epartment of U]ustice .. .[of] the person
as soon as possible beginning 90 days prior to the ... anticipated
62
discharge or release" of that person. The agency must "provide
the district attorney and [D]epartment of [J]ustice with . . . It]he
person's name, identifying factors, anticipated future residence
and offense history.
b. Decisions to Petition for Civil Commitment
To commit a person as a sexually violent person, the Wisconsin
Department of Justice may, at the request of the agency with
jurisdiction over that person, file a petition for commitment. If
the Department of Justice does not file a petition, then a petition
may be filed by the district attorney for "the county in which the
person was convicted of a sexually violent offense [;] . . .the county
in which the person will reside ... upon his or her discharge ....
release on parole[,] or extended supervision"; or "the county in
which the person is in custody .... Simply put, if the Department
of Justice declines to file the petition, the decision is then left with
the district attorneys for various counties.
The petition for civil commitment must be filed in either
"[t]he circuit court for the county in which the person was
convicted of a sexually violent offense," "[t] he circuit court for the
county in which the person will reside or be placed upon his or her
discharge," or "[t]he circuit court for the county in which the
person is in custody. ' ' 6 A petition must allege that "the person
[subject to the petition] has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense," "has been found delinquent for a sexually violent
offense," or "has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense
by reason of mental disease or defect. 6 7 Additionally, the petition
must allege that the person subject to commitment has a mental
disorder and because of that mental disorder is more likely to
62. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.015(2) (a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
63. Id. § 980.015(3) (a) (Westlaw).
64. Id. § 9 8 0.02(1)(a) (Westlaw).
65. Id. § 980.02(1) (b) (1)-(3) (Westlaw).
66. Id. § 980.02(4) (a)-(b) (Westlaw).
67. Id. § 9 80.02(2)(a)(1)-(3) (Westlaw). This standard is different from
Minnesota in that it requires a previous finding of either a sexually violent offense
or a finding of not guilty for a sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease
or defect. See MiNN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 2 (2014); id. § 253D.02, subdivs. 15-
16.
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"engage in acts of sexual violence," which makes that person
dangerous to others. Finally, the petition must "state with
particularity [the] essential facts [which] establish probable cause
to believe the person is a sexually violent person.,69
3. New York's Process for Referrals and Decisions to File Petition for
Commitment
In New York, referrals for possible commitment petitions are
ultimately made by a case review panel, and made only after a
preliminary review by the New York Department of Mental Health.
The case review panel is established by the New York Commissioner
of Mental Health, in consultation with others, and is made up "of at
least fifteen members, any three of whom may sit as a team to
review a particular case. 7 Of the three team members who review
a case, at least two of those members must be professionals in
either the mental health or the developmental disabilities field.7'
When a person who may be a detained sex offender is nearing
release, notice of the individual's anticipated release is given to the
New York Attorney General and the Commissioner of Mental
Health by the agency that is holding the individual. 7' The
Commissioner of Mental Health will designate staff to provide a
preliminary review of whether the individual should be referred to,
and evaluated by, the case review panel7 3
For the cases in which the case review team determines that
the individual "is not a sex offender requiring civil management," it
notifies the individual and the New York Attorney General of that
14determination. At that point, the Attorney General cannot file a
sex offender civil management petition.15 If, on the other hand, the
case review team determines that the referred individual requires
civil management, then the team must notify both the individual
subject to civil management and the Attorney General.7' The notice
68. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.02(b)-(c) (Westlaw).
69. Id. § 980.02(3) (Westlaw).
70. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 10.05(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014,
chs. I to 550).
71. Id. (Westlaw).
72. Id. § 10.05(b) (Westlaw).
73. Id. § 10.05(d) (Westlaw).
74. Id. § 10.05(f) (Westlaw).
75. Id. (Westlaw).
76. Id. § 10.05(g) (Westlaw).
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must be in writing and must include a report from a psychiatric
examiner that contains a determination regarding whether the
individual has a mental abnormality.7 "Approximately 2.8 percent
of those cases reviewed by the Office of Mental Health are referred
to the Attorney General's office for civil management
proceedings."'8
"If the case review team finds that the individual is a sex
offender requiring civil management, then the Attorney General
may [but is not required to] file a sex offender civil management
petition . . . . ,,79 The Attorney General must consider and take into
account information related to any continued supervision the
individual will receive based on a criminal conviction when
deciding whether to file a petition for civil commitment."s Thus,
unlike Minnesota and Wisconsin, in New York, the ultimate
decision on whether to file a petition for civil commitment is made
in a centralized manner and initially informed by a panel consisting
primarily of mental health professionals and later by the New York
Attorney General's Office. Additionally, a petition for civil
commitment in New York must "contain a statement or statements
alleging facts of an evidentiary character tending to support the
allegation that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil
management." 2 The petition for civil commitment may be filed in
either the New York Supreme Court or in the county court of the
county where the individual subject to commitment is located."
B. The Commitment Process
1. Minnesota's Civil Commitment Process
Under the Minnesota commitment statute, an individual who
is subject to a petition for civil commitment, or who has been civilly
committed, has the right to be represented by counsel at any
proceeding relating to his or her civil commitment.84 "The court
77. Id. (Westlaw).
78. Frequently Ask Questions Regarding New York's Civil Management Law, supra
note 46.
79. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(a) (Westlaw).
80. Id. (Westlaw).
81. Compare supra Part II.A. 1, and supra Part II.A.2, with supra Part II.A.3.
82. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(a) (Westlaw).
83. Id. (Westlaw).
84. MINN. STAT. § 253D.20 (2014); see also id. § 253B.07, subdiv. 2(c).
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shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent" the individual if the
individual does not otherwise have counsel85 "The attorney shall be
appointed at the time a petition for commitment is filed or when
... civil commitment examinations are ordered . . .whichever is,,86
sooner. For all proceedings relating to the individual's
commitment,
the attorney shall (1) consult with the person prior to any
hearing; (2) be given adequate time and access to records
to prepare for all hearings; (3) continue to represent the
person throughout any proceedings under [the
Minnesota commitment statute] unless released as
counsel by the court; and (4) be a vigorous advocate on
behalf the person."
Once a petition is filed, the court appoints an examiner for a
preheating examination. But before the hearing, the individual
subject to the petition has the option to choose a second,
independent court-appointed examiner, to be paid for by the
county, to assess the individual.88 While the right may be waived,
both the county attorney and the attorney for the individual subject
to the commitment petition have the right to attend the
prehearing examination.89 "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
a court-appointed examiner shall file the report with the court not
less than 48 hours prior to the commitment hearing. '
The commitment heaing must be held within ninety days
from the date the petition was filed, but, if good cause is shown, the
court may extend that deadline for up to an additional thirty days.9'
If, however, a hearing on a commitment petition has not been held
within that time, the proceeding must be dismissed.
The individual subject to the petition, his or her counsel, "the
petitioner, the county attorney, and any other persons as the court
directs" must have notice of the hearing on the petition, may
attend the hearing and, except for the attorneys, may testify.93 The
85. Id. § 253D.20; see also id. § 253B.07, subdiv. 2(c).
86. Id. § 253B.07, subdiv. 2(c).
87. Id. § 253D.20.
88. Id. § 253B.07, subdiv. 3.
89. Id. § 253B.07, subdiv. 5.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 253B.08, subdiv. 1 (a).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 253B.08, subdivs. 2, 3.
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court may exclude any person who is not necessary from the
hearings, except any person requested to be present by the
94individual who is subject to the petition.
All parties "may present and cross-examine witnesses,
including examiners, at the hearing" and "[t]he court may in its
discretion receive the testimony of any other person. ' 95 Parties may
offer into evidence the opinion of court-appointed examiners only
if the examiner is present to testify, unless the parties agree
otherwise.9 6 "The court shall admit all relevant evidence at the
hearing" and "make its determination upon the entire record
pursuant to the Rules of Evidence." ' Under Minnesota law, there is
no right to ajury trial for civil commitment hearings.
98
"If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
[individual] is a sexually dangerous person or a person with a
sexual psychopathic personality,"9 then
the court shall commit the person to a secure treatment
facility unless the person establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment
program is available, is willing to accept the [person]
under commitment, and is consistent with the person's
treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.'9
In reality, however, Minnesota does not have any available
alternatives to the high security treatment facilities that currently
house Minnesota's civilly committed sex offenders.' Therefore,
although some judges may be willing to consider alternative
placements, none currently exist.'0 2
If the court determines that the individual subject to
commitment is an SDP or SPP, then "the court shall order
commitment for an indeterminate period of time."'"3 At that point,
94. Id. § 253B.08, subdiv. 3.
95. Id. § 253B.08, subdiv. 5(a).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 253B.08, subdiv. 7.
98. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
99. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3.
100. Id.
101. See LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
102. See id. ("There is only one other residential treatment program in
Minnesota for sex offenders, but that program will not accept any sex offenders
who are being considered for civil commitment.").
103. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 4.
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the committed person may be transferred, provisionally discharged,
or fully discharged only by going through the process set out in the
statute and described later in this article. °1
2. Wisconsin's Civil Commitment Process
In Wisconsin, a person who is subject to a petition for civil
commitment as a sexually violent person has the right to "(a) ...
the appointment of counsel; (b) [r] emain silent; (c) [p]resent and
cross-examine witnesses; [and] (d) [h]ave the hearing recorded by
a court reporter.•,
0
5
The court may appoint, or the state may retain, at least one
qualified licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or other mental
health professional to conduct an examination of the person's
mental condition and to testify at trial.'06 "Whenever a person who
is the subject of a petition . . . is required to submit to an
examination of his or her mental condition" under the Wisconsin
statute, then "he or she may retain a licensed physician, licensed
psychologist, or other mental health professional" to conduct their
own examination of the person's mental condition and to testify at
trial. ' If the person is indigent, the court will appoint a qualified
professional to perform the exam and testify on the person's
behalf. '
Unlike Minnesota, where the determination of whether good
cause exists to proceed with the petition is solely within the
discretion of the various county attorneys, in Wisconsin, before the
petition can proceed to trial, the court must "hold a hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person named in the petition is a sexually violent person."'' 9 The
court must hold the probable cause hearing within thirty days
unless good cause is shown, the parties stipulate to a later time, or
the person is in custody."'
If the court determines that probable cause indicating the
individual to be a sexually violent person does not exist, then the
104. Id.; see infra Part II.D.1.
105. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.03(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
106. Id. § 980.031(1)-(2) (Westlaw).
107. Id. § 980.031(3) (Westlaw).
108. Id. (Westlaw).
109. Id. § 980.04(2) (a) (Westlaw).
110. Id. § 980.04(2)(b)(1) (Westlaw).
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petition must be dismissed."' Alternatively, if it is determined that
probable cause does exist, the individual must be taken into
custody, if that has not already happened."1 2 A trial must then be
held within ninety days after the date of the probable cause
hearing, except for good cause or by stipulation, for a final
determination of whether the person shall be committed as a
sexually violent person."'
Again, unlike Minnesota, any party may request a jury trial for
the hearing on the petition."' The request, however, must be made
"within ten days after the probable cause hearing."" 15 "If no request
is made, the trial shall be to the court."'"I6 At the trial, "the
petitioner has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person who is the subject of the petition is a sexually
violent person."''' This standard differs from that found in
Minnesota, where the burden of proof is met by clear and• - 118
convincing evidence.
In Wisconsin, a petition is dismissed if reasonable doubt exists
regarding the person's sexually violent nature, and that person
must "be released unless he or she is under some other lawful• . ,119
restriction. "Evidence that the person who is the subject of a
petition . . . was convicted for or committed sexually violent
offenses before committing the offense or act on which the petition
is based is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person has a mental disorder."2
If a court or jury determines that the person who is the
subject of a petition ... is a sexually violent person, [then]
the court shall order the person to be committed to the
custody of the department for control, care and treatment
until . . the person is no longer a sexually violent
121
person.
111. Id. § 980.04(3) (Westlaw).
112. Id. (Westlaw).
113. Id. § 980.05(1), (5) (Westlaw).
114. Id. § 980.05(2) (Westlaw).
115. Id. (Westlaw).
116. Id. (Westlaw).
117. Id. § 980.05(3) (a) (Westlaw).
118. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3 (2014).
119. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(5) (Westlaw).
120. Id. § 980.05(4) (Westlaw).
121. Id. § 980.06 (Westlaw).
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3. New York's Civil Commitment Process
As in both Minnesota and Wisconsin, promptly upon the filing
of a petition in New York, the court must appoint counsel if the
individual who is the subject of a petition is financially unable to
obtain counsel. 122 "The court shall appoint the mental hygiene legal
service if possible. 123
The New York Attorney General may request that the court
order the individual who is potentially the subject of the petition
"to submit to an evaluation by a psychiatric examiner" at any time
after being notified by the agency of the individual's anticipated
release but before trial for the commitment petition. 12 "Upon such
a request, the court shall order that the [person] submit to an
evaluation by a psychiatric examiner chosen by the [A]ttorney
[Gieneral . . . . Again, "if [that person] is not represented by
counsel, the court shall appoint counsel for [him or her]."
"Following the evaluation, [the examiner] shall report his or her
findings in writing to the [A]ttorney [G]eneral, to counsel for [the
individual], and to the court."
1 27
"At any time after the filing of a sex offender civil management
petition, and prior to trial," the individual who is subject to the
petition may also request that the court order a psychiatricS • 128
examination. 8As in both Wisconsin and Minnesota, "[i]f the
[individual] is financially unable to obtain an examiner, [then] the
court shall appoint an examiner of [the individual's] choice to be
paid" as permitted by law. 129 "Following the evaluation, such
psychiatric examiner shall report his or her findings in writing to
the [individual] or [his or her] counsel . . . . to the [A]ttorney
[G]eneral, and to the court.,
130
122. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(c) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014,
chs. 1 to 550); see also MINN. STAT. §253D.20; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.03(2)(a)
(Westlaw).
123. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(c) (Westlaw).
124. Id. § 10.06(d) (Westlaw).
125. Id. (Westlaw).
126. Id. (Westlaw).
127. Id. (Westlaw).
128. Id. § 10.06(e) (Westlaw).
129. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subdiv. 3 (2014); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 980.031(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
130. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(e) (Westlaw).
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As in Wisconsin, but not Minnesota, the New York Supreme
Court or county court in which the petition is pending must hold
"a hearing . . . to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the [person] is a sex offender requiring civilS 131
management" prior to proceeding to trial. The probable cause
hearing must be held within thirty days after the petition is filed,
unless the individual subject to the petition agrees to a longer
time. 3 2 "At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a
sex offender requiring civil management. If the court determines
that probable cause has not been established," then the court must• . 133 "I
dismiss the petition. If the court determines that probable cause
has been established ... the court shall set a date for trial."'34 The
person will remain in custody with the Department of Corrections
or be committed to a secure treatment facility until the
commitment trial is complete.
3 5
As in Wisconsin, if probable cause is found, then the individual
has a right to a jury trial on the ultimate determination of whether
he or she "is a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental,, 136
abnormality. This trial must be held within sixty days after a137"b
finding of probable cause and must "be held before the same
court that conducted the probable cause hearing unless either the
[A] ttorney [G] eneral or counsel for the [individual] has moved for
a change of venue and the motion has been granted by the
court."' T8
If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous,
1 9
and the jury or the court must find "by clear and convincing
evidence [that the individual] is a detained sex offender who
suffers from a mental abnormality" in order for the person to be
committed.1  This is the same standard that is found in
131. See id. § 10.06(g) (Westlaw).
132. Id. (Westlaw).
133. Id. § 10.06(k) (Westlaw).
134. Id. (Westlaw).
135. Id. (Westlaw).
136. Id. § 10.07(a) (Westlaw).
137. Id. (Westlaw).
138. Id. (Westlaw).
139. Id. § 10.07(d) (Westlaw).
140. Id. (Westlaw).
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Minnesota.141 In New York, however, the Attorney General holds
the burden of proof.
1 42
The jury may not find that the individual is a detained sex
offender who suffers from a mental abnormality solely on the basis143
of his or her commission of a sex offense. If the court or
unanimous jury "determines that the [A]ttorney [G]eneral has not
sustained his or her burden," the court must dismiss the petition,
and the individual shall be released absent any other provisions of
law. 
144
"If the jury is unable to render a unanimous verdict, the court
shall continue any commitment order previously issued and
schedule a second trial to be held within sixty days ....
Additionally, "[i]f the jury in such second trial is unable to render a
unanimous verdict as to whether the [individual] is a detained sex
offender who suffers from a mental abnormality, [then] the court
[must] dismiss the petition. '14
If the jury or the court concludes that the individual is a
detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormality, then
the court has two options."'7 It "shall consider whether the
[individual] is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or
a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.'
' 48
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the [individual] has a mental abnormality involving such a
strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an
inability to control behavior, that the [individual] is likely
to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not
confined to a secure treatment facility, then the court
shall find [that individual] to be a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement. In such case, [that individual]
shall be committed to a secure treatment facility for care,
141. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3 (2014).
142. Compare MENTAL HYc.. § 10.07(d) (Westlaw), with MINN. STAT. § 253D.07,
subdiv. I (indicating that in Minnesota, the petition is filed by the county
attorney).
143. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(d) (Westlaw).
144. Id. § 10.07(e) (Westlaw).
145. Id. (Westlaw).
146. Id. (Westlaw).
147. Id. § 10.07(0 (Westlaw).
148. Id. (Westlaw).
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treatment, and control until such time as he or she no
longer requires confinement. 19
On the other hand, if the individual is not sentenced to
confinement, then the court will make a determination that the
individual requires strict and intensive supervision. 50 At that point,
the individual "shall be subject to a regimen of strict and intensive
supervision and treatment" as described in the statute. 51 When
making this finding, "the court shall consider the conditions that
would be imposed upon the [individual] if [he or she were] subject
to a regimen of strict and intensive supervision, and all available
information about the prospects for the [individual's] possible re-
entry into the community.'
"Before ordering the release of a person to a regimen of strict
and intensive supervision and treatment .... the court shall order
that the department of corrections and community supervision
recommend supervision requirements to the court.' 5 3 Also, the
Commissioner is responsible for determining a specific treatment
for the individual subject to strict and intensive supervision and
treatment after consulting with a professional that is primarily
treating the individual. 5 4 The court, after providing the parties with
a copy of the recommended requirements and offering the parties
the opportunity to be heard, "shall issue an order specifying the
conditions of the regimen of strict and intensive supervision and
treatment, which shall include specified supervision requirements
and compliance with a specified course of treatment.
155
149. Id. (Westlaw).
150. Id. (Westlaw).
151. Id. (Westlaw); see also id. § 10.11 (Westlaw). Minnesota similarly provides
the opportunity for a court to find that an individual may be committed to a less
restrictive treatment program. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3 (2014). As
discussed above, there are no such alternatives available for the courts to utilize.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-102. In New York, from April 13, 2007, to
March 31, 2013, a total of ninety-four sex offenders were initially placed in this
alternative program. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GEN. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BUREAU, A REPORT ON THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
TREATMENT ACT 23 (2013), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files
/pdfs/bureaus/sexualoffender/SOMB_2013_AnnualReport.pdf.
152. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(f) (Westlaw).
153. Id. § 10.11(a) (1) (Westlaw).
154. Id. (Westlaw).
155. Id. § 10.11(a) (2) (Westlaw).
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C. Required Periodic Reviews of Individuals Civilly Committed as Sex
Offenders
1. Minnesota's Required Periodic Review
Minnesota's civil commitment statute does not provide for any
required periodic review or any reporting to the court as to the
status of the civilly committed individual. There are internal
quarterly reviews and annual reviews that are conducted by
treatment providers at the secure treatment facility. 5 6 Those do
not, however, consider whether or not the individual satisfies the
requirements for provisional or full discharge, nor do they provide
a risk assessment of the committed individual. There is no
statutorily required independent examination or review of a
committed individual, or right to one at any point in his or her
commitment, unless and until a petition for reduction in custody is
filed.
157
2. Wisconsin's Required Periodic Review
Unlike Minnesota, in Wisconsin, if a person is committed
under Wisconsin Statutes section 980.06 and has not yet been
discharged "within 12 months after the date of the initial
commitment order," the Wisconsin Department of Health Services
"shall appoint an examiner to conduct a reexamination of the
person's mental condition. . . to determine whether the person has
made sufficient progress for the court to consider whether the
person should be placed on supervised release or discharged. ' A
reexamination must occur at least once every twelve months after
the initial commitment, 159 and the committing court "may order a
reexamination of [that] person at any time during the period in
which the person is subject to the commitment order."'O During
the reexamination, the examiner shall apply the criteria used when
considering if the person should be placed on supervised release or
discharged.
156. See LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 73.
157. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.27 (2014).
158. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.07(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
159. Id. (Westlaw).
160. Id. § 980.07(3) (Westlaw).
161. See id. (Westlaw).
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At the time of a reexamination, the committed individual may
retain his or her own licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or
other mental health professional or the court shall appoint one
upon request of the committed person. 62 The examiner must
prepare a written report of the reexamination no later than thirty
days after the date of the reexamination for the Wisconsin
Department of Health Services. 6 At the time of the reexamination,
the treating professionals (i.e., the professionals who have been
treating the committed individual at the secured treatment facility)
also prepare a treatment progress report to submit to the
department. 1' The report considers:
(a) The specific factors associated with the person's risk
for committing another sexually violent offense.
(b) Whether the person is making significant progress in
treatment or has refused treatment.
(c) The ongoing treatment needs of the person.
(d) Any specialized needs or conditions associated with
the person that must be considered in future treatment
planning.'
The Department must submit an annual report (that includes
the reexamination report and the treatment progress report) to
the initial committing court, the committed individual, the
Department of Justice, and the district attorney. 6 The court shall
provide a copy of the annual report to the committed person's
167
attorney.
3. New York's Required Periodic Review
Similar to Wisconsin, New York's commitment statute provides
that each person committed as a sex offender "shall have an
examination for evaluation of his or her mental condition made at
least once every year.' 8 At this same time, the committed person
also has the right to be evaluated by an independent psychiatric
162. Id. § 980.07(1) (Westlaw); id. § 980.031(3) (Westlaw).
163. Id. § 980.07(2) (Westlaw).
164. Id. § 980.07(4) (Westlaw).
165. Id. (Westlaw).
166. Id. § 980.07(6) (Westlaw).
167. Id. (Westlaw).
168. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014,
chs. I to 550).
2015]
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
examiner. 69 If the committed person is financially unable to obtain
an examiner, an examiner of the committed person's choice will be
appointed and will be paid as prescribed by law."'
Following the annual evaluation, "each psychiatric examiner
shall report his or her findings in writing to the [C]ommissioner
and to counsel for [the committed individual] . After reviewing
the "relevant records and reports, along with the findings of the
psychiatric examiners, [the Commissioner] shall make a
determination in writing as to whether the [committed person] is
currently a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.'
7
1
In addition to the annual evaluation, under New York law,
"[i]f, at any time the [C]ommissioner determines that the
[committed person] no longer is a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement, the [Ciommissioner shall petition the
court for discharge of the [individual] or for the imposition of a
regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment.'7 7 This
affirmative obligation of the Commissioner to petition for
discharge is not found in Minnesota's sex offender commitment
laws.
D. Release from Commitment
1. Minnesota's Process for Transfer, Provisional Discharge, or Full
Discharge
Under Minnesota's sex offender commitment statute, a
petition for a reduction in custody may be filed by either the
committed person or by the executive director of the Minnesota
State Sex Offender Program.11 4 The petition will then be
considered by a panel of the special review board. 1 5 Under the
169. Id. (Westlaw).
170. Id. (Westlaw).
171. Id. (Westlaw) (alteration in original).
172. Id. (Westlaw).
173. Id. § 10.09(e) (Westlaw).
174. MiNN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdiv. 2 (2014).
175. Id. The special review board is established by the Commissioner of
Human Services. Id. § 253B.18, subdiv. 4c ("The board shall consist of three
members experienced in the field of mental illness. One member of each special
review board panel shall be a psychiatrist or a doctoral level psychologist with
forensic experience and one member shall be an attorney. No member shall be
affiliated with the Department of Human Services.").
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statute, a "'reduction in custody' means transfer out of a secure
treatment facility, a provisional discharge, or a discharge from
commitment."
6
Under the statute,
[a] person who is committed as a sexually dangerous
person or a person with a sexual psychopathic personality
shall not be transferred out of a secure treatment facility
unless the transfer is appropriate. . . . The following
factors must be considered in determining whether a
transfer is appropriate: (1) the person's clinical progress
and present treatment needs; (2) the need for security to
accomplish continuing treatment; (3) the need for
continued institutionalization; (4) which facility can best
meet the person's needs; and (5) whether transfer can be
accornlished with a reasonable degree of safety for the
public. 
77
A transfer may be made to another treatment facility within the
Commissioner's control.
7
1
A person committed as a sexually dangerous person or a
person with a sexual psychopathic personality shall not be
provisionally discharged unless he or she is capable of making an
acceptable adjustment to open society.
179
The following factors are considered in determining
whether a provisional discharge shall be granted:
(1) whether the committed person's course of treatment
and present mental status indicate there is no longer a
need for treatment and supervision in the committed
person's current treatment setting; and
(2) whether the conditions of the provisional discharge
plan will provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
public and will enable the committed person to adjust
successfully to the community.'80
A committed person may not be fully discharged unless the
person has the recommendation of a majority of the special review
board and the judicial appeal panel (also referred to as the
176. Id. § 253D.27, subdiv. l(b).
177. Id. § 253D.29, subdiv. 1.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 253D.30, subdiv. 1.
180. Id.
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Supreme Court of Appeals Panel (SCAP)) finds that the committed
person "is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open
society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer in
need of inpatient treatment and supervision. " 's
In determining whether a discharge shall be
recommended, the special review board and judicial
appeal panel shall consider whether specific conditions
exist to provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
public and to assist the committed person in adjusting to
the community. If the desired conditions do not exist, the
discharge shall not be granted.1
2
The special review board must hold a hearing on each petition
for reduction in custody before issuing a recommendation and
report."' Within thirty days of the hearing, the special review board
shall issue a report with written findings of fact and a
recommendation either denying or approving the petition to the
judicial appeal panel."' The Commissioner must then forward the
report of the special review board to the judicial appeal panel and
to every person entitled to statutory notice. s5 A recommendation
for reduction in custody by the special review board is not effective
until it has been reviewed by the judicial appeal panel and until
fifteen days after an order from the judicial appeal panel affirming,
modifying, or denying the recommendation.
The committed person, the county attorney, or the
Commissioner "may petition the judicial appeal panel . . . for a
rehearing and reconsideration of a recommendation of the special
review board."''1 7 But if none of these parties petitions for a
rehearing or reconsideration of the special review board's
recommendation, then the judicial appeal panel may adopt the
special review board's recommendation without a hearing or may
181. Id. § 253D.31.
182. Id.
183. Id. § 253D.27, subdiv. 3.
184. Id. § 253D.27, subdiv. 4. The judicial appeal panel is established by the
Minnesota Supreme Court and is composed of three judges and four alternate
judges appointed from among the actingjudges of the state to hear appeals from
the special review board. Id. § 253B.19, subdiv. 1.
185. Id. § 253D.27, subdiv. 4.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 253D.28, subdiv. 1(a).
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schedule a hearing on the petition for reduction in custody."' 8 "The
petitioning party seeking discharge or provisional discharge bears
the burden of going forward with the evidence, which means
presenting a prima facie case with competent evidence to show that
the person is entitled to the requested relief."' 89 Upon satisfying this
burden, the party opposing the discharge or provisional discharge
must then establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
petition should be denied.2 0
"A majority of the judicial appeal panel shall rule upon the
petition" after a de novo review."' "The [judicial appeal] panel may
not consider petitions for relief other than those considered by the
special review board from which the appeal is taken ... [and] may
not grant a transfer or provisional discharge on terms or conditions
that were not presented to the special review board."'9'2
If the judicial appeal panel grants a committed individual's
petition for provisional discharge, then that individual's course of
treatment and release to the community is governed by the terms
of that individual's provisional discharge plan until either a change
of the terms is granted or full discharge is granted by the judicial
appeal panel.'"2 "A committed person may not petition the special
review board any sooner than six months following either" the
original order for commitment (or the exhaustion of all related
appeals) or "any recommendation of the special review board or
order of the judicial appeal panel [or the exhaustion of all
appeals], whichever is later.,
9 4
If the committed person violates the terms of his or her
provisional discharge plan or exhibits dangerous behavior, then
the executive director may revoke the committed person's
provisional discharge. 95 Upon revocation, the committed person is
immediately returned to the Minnesota sex offender treatment
facility. 196 In order to revoke the provisional discharge, the
188. Id. § 253D.28, subdiv. 1 (c).
189. Id. § 253D.28, subdiv. 2(d).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 253D.28, subdiv. 3.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 253D.30, subdiv. 3. However, to date, no individual has ever been
fully discharged from commitment. See infra notes 412-13 and accompanying text.
194. Id. § 253D.27, subdiv. 2.
195. Id. § 253D.30, subdiv. 5(a).
196. Id. § 253D.30, subdiv. 5(b).
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executive director must issue a "report documenting reasons for
revocation," including "the specific facts upon which the revocation
is based."' 97 The report
shall be issued . . .within seven days after the committed
person is returned to the treatment facility. Advance
notice to the committed person of the revocation is not
required.
. . . The committed person must be provided a copy of
the revocation report and informed [of his or her right to
appeal] ....
. . An individual who is revoked from provisional
discharge must successfully re-petition the special review
board and judicial appeal panel prior to being placed
back on provisional discharge.'"
Upon receiving the revocation report, the committed person
or any interested party may petition the special review board for a
review of the revocation, which must be scheduled within thirty
days.199 The petition must occur within seven days upon receiving
the revocation report.2 °° "The special review board shall review the
circumstances leading to the revocation and shall recommend to
the judicial appeal panel whether or not the revocation shall be
upheld. The special review board may also recommend a new
provisional discharge at the time of the revocation hearing."
20'
2. Wisconsin's Process for Release
In Wisconsin, a committed individual may petition the
202committing court for supervised release or full discharge. A
committed individual seeking supervised release must first petition
the committing court to modify its commitment order by
authorizing supervised release.2 3 A committed individual may
petition for supervised release "if at least 12 months have elapsed
since the initial commitment order was entered or at least 12
197. Id. § 253D.30, subdivs. 5(b)-(c).
198. Id. § 253D.30, subdivs. 5(b)-(d).
199. Id. § 253D.30, subdiv. 6.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.08(1), 980.09(1) (West, Westlaw through Act 380
2013).
203. Id. § 980.08(1) (Westlaw).
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months have elapsed since the most recent release petition was
denied, since supervised release was denied . . .or since the mostS ,,204
recent order for supervised release was revoked. In addition, the
director of the facility where the committed individual is placed
can also petition for supervised release on the individuals' behalf at
any time.-W,
"The person submitting the petition [to modify] may use
experts or professional persons to support his or her petition. The
district attorney or the department ofjustice may [also] use experts
or professional persons to support or oppose any petition. 2 0 ' After
receiving the petition, "the court shall appoint one or more
examiners . ..who have the specialized knowledge . . .who will
examine the person and furnish a written report of the
examination to the court., 207 The committed person may similarly
request the appointment of an examiner.0 8 If requested within
twenty one days after filing the petition, the court must appoint, at
the expense of the county, an examiner for the committed
person. N9 "If any such examiner believes that the person is
appropriate for supervised release.., the examiner shall report on
the type of treatment and services that the person may need while
in the community on supervised release."1
Supervised release decisions are made by the court, not a
jury.211 As a result, upon receiving the examiner's report, the court
must hear the petition to modify the commitment order to
authorize supervised release. In making a decision, the court may
consider without limitation:
the nature and circumstances of the behavior that was the
basis of the allegation in the petition .... the person's
mental history and present mental condition, where the
person will live, how the person will support himself or
herself, and what arrangements are available to ensure
204. Id. (Westlaw).
205. Id. (Westlaw).
206. Id. § 980.08 (2m) (Westlaw).
207. Id. § 980.08(3) (a) (Westlaw).
208. Id. § 980.08(3)(a)-(b) (Westlaw).
209. Id. (Westlaw).
210. Id. § 980.08(3)(b) (Westlaw).
211. Id. § 980.08 (4) (a) (Westlaw).
212. Id. (Westlaw).
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that the person has access to and will participate in
213necessary treatment ....
Supervised release may not be granted unless the court
determines that the following criteria, based on "all of the reports,
trial records, and evidence presented," are met:
1. The person is making significant progress in treatment
and the person's progress can be sustained while on
supervised release.
2. It is substantially probable that the person will not
engage in an act of sexual violence while on supervised
release.
3. Treatment that meets the person's needs and a
qualified provider of the treatment are reasonably
available.
4. The person can be reasonably expected to comply with
his or her treatment requirements and with all of his or
her conditions or rules of supervised release that are
imposed by the court or by the department.
5. A reasonable level of resources can provide for the level
of residential placement, supervision, and ongoing
treatment needs that are required for the safe
management of the person while on supervised release.214
"The person [requesting supervised release] has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person meets the
criteria [listed above]." 215
If the criteria are met, then the court will select a county of
intended placement for the committed individual to be placed if
supervised release is granted.2' 6 The committed individual, among
others, may submit prospective residential options for his or her
community placement. The county department in the selected
county of placement must also prepare a report that identifies
prospective residential options for community placement.2" The
county department must then create a supervised release plan for
the committed individual based on the submitted residential
213. Id. § 980.08(4)(c) (Westlaw).
214. Id. § 980.08(4) (cg) (Westlaw).
215. Id. § 980.08(4)(cj) (Westlaw).
216. Id. § 980.08(4)(cm) (Westlaw).
217. Id. § 980.08(4) (d) (Westlaw).
218. Id. § 980.08(4) (e) (Westlaw).
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options that ultimately identifies a proposed residence.2 1 9 The plan
must also "address the person's need, if any, for supervision,
counseling, medication, community support services, residential
services, vocational services, and alcohol or other drug abuse
treatment. ' ' 2  The committing court then reviews the plan
submitted and "[i]f the details of the plan adequately meet the
treatment needs of the individual and the safety needs of the
community, then the court shall approve the plan and determine• . ,221
that supervised release is appropriate. If, on the other hand, the
court determines the proposed plan will not adequately meet the
treatment needs of the individual and the safety needs of the
community, then the court will either determine that supervised
release is inappropriate or, alternatively, direct the county
122
department to prepare a revised plan. If granted supervised
release, the committed individual is ordered to be placed in the
community by the committing court.221 The committed individual
224
remains under DHS care, custody, and control.
In contrast to a petition for supervised release, a committed
person may petition the committing court for full discharge at any
time.225 A committed individual is appropriate for discharge when
that person's condition has changed such that the person no
longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent
226
person.
Similar to a petition to modify commitment, the committed
person petitioning for full discharge and the district attorney or the
Department of Justice may rely on experts or other professionalS• 227 -
persons to support or oppose any petition. Again, similar to a
petition to modify commitment, "[aifter receiving a petition for
discharge . . . and upon the request of the person filing the
petition, unless the court previously appointed an examiner.., for
the current reexamination period, the court shall appoint . . an
examiner having the specialized knowledge determined by the
219. Id. § 980.08 (4) (f) (Westlaw).
220. Id. (Westlaw).
221. Id. § 980.08 (4) (g) (Westlaw).
222. Id. (Westlaw).
223. Id. § 980.08(4) (cm), (6m) (Westlaw).
224. Id. § 980.08(6m) (Westlaw).
225. See id. § 980.08(1) (Westlaw).
226. Id. § 980.09(2) (Westlaw).
227. Id. § 980.09(1) (c) (Westlaw).
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• ,,228court to be ajgpropriate. The county shall pay the costs of such
an examiner.
If the petitioner fails to allege facts that would enable the court
or a jury to determine that "the person's condition has sufficiently
changed such that ... the person no longer meets the criteria for
commitment as a sexually violent person," then a petition for full
discharge will be denied without a hearing.
230
But if the petitioner has alleged sufficient facts, then "the
court may hold a hearing to determine if the person no longer
meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. 231
In deciding if the person no longer meets the criteria for
commitment, the court will look to: the record, supporting
documentation provided by the parties, "evidence introduced at
the initial commitment trial or the most recent trial on a petition
for discharge," relevant facts set forth in the petition and the state's
response, arguments of counsel, and any current or past reports
filed under section 980.07 (periodic reexamination and treatment
232progress, report from the department).
If, based on the court's review, it "determines that the record
does not contain facts from which a court or jury would likely
conclude that the person no longer meets the criteria for
commitment, the court [must] deny the petition." But, "if the court
determines that the record contains facts from which a court or
jury would likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria
for commitment, the court shall set the matter for trial." If the
matter is set for trial, the trial must be held within ninety days "of
the determination that the person's condition has sufficiently
changed such that a court or jury would likely conclude that the
person no longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexuallyg,233
violent person.
A trial before a jury of six must be allowed on a petition for
discharge if requested by the district attorney, the Department of
228. Id. § 980.09(1)(d) (Westlaw).
229. Id. (Westlaw).
230. Id. § 980.09(2) (Westlaw). "If the person files a petition for a discharge
. . .without counsel, as soon as circumstances permit, the court shall refer the
matter to the authority for indigency determinations ... and appointment of
counsel." Id. § 980.09(1) (b) (Westlaw).
231. Id. § 980.09(2) (Westlaw).
232. Id. (Westlaw).
233. Id. § 980.09(2)-(3) (Westlaw).
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Justice, or the committed person. 231 Juries for discharge petitions
are selected and treated in the same way as they are in civil
actions. 235 "At trial, the state has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the person meets the criteria for
commitment as a sexually violent person."2" ' If the court or jury
determines that the state has shown, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person meets the criteria for commitment, then
the court must deny the petition for discharge but proceed to
237
determine whether to authorize supervised release. If, on the
other hand, the state fails to meet its burden, then the person's
238
petition for discharge must be granted.
3. New York's Process for Modification or Release from Commitment
In New York, the Commissioner must provide the committed
individual and his or her counsel "with an annual written notice of
the right to petition the court for discharge."239 New York law
requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing for a committed
individual if the individual has either petitioned for discharge, or
has not affirmatively waived the right to petition.240 The court shall
also hold an evidentiary hearing if the court finds, based on the
required annual evaluation of the committed individual, that there
is a substantial issue as to whether the committed individual
remains a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.
2 4
1
In addition to the annual written notice of the right to
petition, the committed individual may petition the court for
discharge and/or release to the community "under a regimen of
strict and intensive supervision and treatment" at any time.2 2 Upon
234. Id. § 980.095(1) (a) (Westlaw). No verdict is valid unless at least five of the
jurors agree to it. Id. § 98 0 .0 95(1) (c) (Westlaw).
235. Id. § 980.095(1) (b) (Westlaw).
236. Id. § 980.09(3) (Westlaw). In contrast, in Minnesota, a committed
individual may no longer meet the statutory criteria for commitment, but may not
be discharged if he or she does not meet the discharge criteria. LEGISLATIVE
AUDrrOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 87 (citing Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.
1995)).
237. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.09(4) (Westlaw).
238. Id. (Westlaw).
239. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 10.09(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014,
chs. 1 to 550).
240. Id. § 10.09(d) (Westlaw).
241. Id. (Westlaw).
242. Id. § 10.09(f) (Westlaw).
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review of the petition, the court may order that an evidentiary
hearing be held, or, except in connection with annual reviews, the
court "may deny an evidentiary hearing and deny the petition upon
a finding that the petition is frivolous or does not provide sufficient
basis for reexamination prior to the next annual review.""24 If the
court holds an evidentiary hearing, either as part of the annual
review or resulting from a petition by the committed individual, the
Attorney General shall have the burden to prove that the individual
is currently "a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.,
244
"At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is currently a
dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, the court shall
continue the respondent's confinement., 24 5 But if the court
determines that the respondent does not require continued
confinement, then the court will order that the respondent be
discharged to strict and intensive supervision and treatment, unless
the court determines that the respondent is no longer inflicted
with a mental abnormality.
246
The conditions of a committed individual's strict and intensive
supervision may be modified or terminated based on the petition
of the individual, the individual's supervising parole officer, the
Commissioner, or the Attorney General. 24' But a person subject to
a regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment may248 .-
only petition once every two years. If any of these parties files a
petition for modification or termination, the court may require a
report from both the Commissioner and the Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision that outlines the behavior
and conduct of the person who is on strict and intensive• . , P 249 -
supervision and treatment. The court may hold a hearing on
petitions to modify or terminate the regimen of strict and intensive
250supervision and treatment. If the petition is for modification, the
burden is on the party seeking modification to show that those
243. Id. (Westlaw).
244. Id. § 10.09(d), (f) (Westlaw).
245. Id. § 10.09(h) (Westlaw).
246. Id. (Westlaw).
247. Id. § 10.11(f) (Westlaw).
248. Id. (Westlaw).
249. Id. (Westlaw).
250. Id. § 10.11 (g), (h) (Westlaw).
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modifications are warranted.25 ' The court must order such
modifications to the extent that it finds that the party has met that
252burden. If the petition is for termination, "the [A] ttorney
[G]eneral shall have the burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the [committed individual] is currently a
sex offender requiring civil management. ' 5,2  The individual must
be discharged from strict and intensive supervision and treatment if
the Attorney General fails to meet this burden.254 If, on the other
hand, the Attorney General meets the burden by clear and
convincing evidence, then the individual must remain under the
regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment.255 But
the court may, as warranted, revise the conditions of supervision
256and treatment.
E. Summary
In summary, there are some key differences in these
commitment statutes that may explain some of the disparity in the
number of people committed to and being discharged from
Minnesota versus Wisconsin or New York. They include the
following:
* Minnesota laws specifically allow for commitment for offenses
that involve emotional harm as well as those involving physical
harm or violence in contrast to most states (including
Wisconsin and New York), which require a violent offense for
civil commitment.
* In most cases, referrals for possible civil commitment in
Minnesota are made by the Department of Corrections after
internal screening of all incarcerated sex offenders, whereas
referrals in New York are made by a case review panel
(established by the New York Commissioner of Mental Health)
but only after a preliminary review by the Department of
Mental Health. In Wisconsin, referrals are made by an agency
that has custody or control over a person who may meet the
criteria for commitment.
251. Id. § 10.11(g) (Westlaw).
252. Id. (Westlaw).
253. Id. § 10.11(h) (Westlaw).
254. Id. (Westlaw).
255. Id. (Westlaw).
256. Id. (Westlaw).
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* Decisions on whether to petition for commitment are left to
the discretion of the various county attorneys in Minnesota. In
Wisconsin, either the Department of Justice or the county
district attorneys may petition for civil commitment. But in
New York, only the Attorney General has the discretion to file
civil commitment petitions against sex offenders.
* Minnesota does not provide for a probable cause hearing for
petitions for civil commitments of sex offenders, whereas in
both New York and Wisconsin there must first be a probable
cause hearing before a petition can proceed to the
commitment trial.
* Minnesota does not provide for a jury trial on civil
commitment petitions for sex offenders, whereas both
Wisconsin and New York do provide forjury trials.
* The standard for commitment in Minnesota and New York is
clear and convincing evidence. However, in New York, this
finding must be unanimous if there is a jury trial. In
Wisconsin, the petitioner has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person who is the subject of the
petition is a sexually violent person.
* Unlike New York, Minnesota does not have a less restrictive
alternative program where people can be diverted to, rather
than committed to, a high security facility. Although Wisconsin
does not have a less restrictive alternative program at the front
end, it does divert people into such programs through
supervised release.
" Minnesota does not require any independent periodic review
of each civilly committed individual or any reporting to the
court of the individual's status. Wisconsin requires an annual
reexamination (including a report which is sent to the
committing court) of the person's mental condition to
determine whether sufficient progress has been made in order
for the court to consider whether the person should be placed
on supervised release or discharged, at which time the
committed individual may retain his or her own independent
examiner as well. New York likewise requires an annual
reexamination of each committed individual for evaluation of
his or her mental condition, at which time the committed
person also has the right to an independent psychiatric
examiner. Each examiner provides his or her written findings
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to the Commissioner and the counsel for the committed
individual.
* New York requires the Commissioner to petition the court for
discharge to a less restrictive alternative for any individual that
the Commissioner determines is no longer a dangerous sex
offender requiring confinement. Minnesota does not have
such a requirement.
" In Minnesota, a petition for reduction in custody, including
provisional and full discharge, must be filed first with the
Special Review Board (SRB), and then the Supreme Court
Appeal Panel must review the SRB's determination de novo.
In Wisconsin, a committed individual may petition the
committing court directly for discharge or supervised release,
and there is a right to ajury trial on petitions for discharge. In
New York, the Commissioner must provide the committed
individuals or their counsel with an annual written notice of
the right to petition the court for discharge or for discharge to
the less restrictive treatment program. Again, these petitions
are made directly to the court.
These differences play an important role in protecting the
rights of committed individuals by making Wisconsin and New York
continue to analyze and justify the further commitment of the
individuals on an annual basis. Moreover, by requiring these
annual evaluations and reports, the two programs are forced to
regularly justify the individual's progress and specify the reasons for
continued confinement. Thus, although these differences alone
cannot explain fully the disparities between Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and New York, they certainly play a strong role in holding the
Wisconsin and New York programs accountable to the courts of
those states.
III. ANALYSIS OF KEY STATE COURT OPINIONS
A. State Court Opinions Regarding Minnesota's Sex Offender
Commitment Statute
Minnesota enacted a psychopathic personality commitment
statute (PP statute) in 1939, becoming the third state to do so.25'The PP statute defined the term "psychopathic personality" as:
257. Act approved Apr. 21, 1939, ch. 369, 1939 Minn. Laws 712, 712-13;John
20151
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
[T]he existence in any person of such conditions of
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack
of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to
appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination
of any such conditions, as to render such person
irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual
258matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
Soon after its enactment, the Minnesota Supreme Court
narrowed the reach of this statutory definition in response to
constitutional vagueness challenges in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court.259 Finding that it would be unreasonable to apply the
provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct
or even to persons having strong sexual propensities, the court
held that the law only includes
those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to
control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or
other evil on the obj.ects of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire.2
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation narrowed the
statutory language in at least two ways. First, it required that the
person must have a past history of sexual misconduct and, second,
it required an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses.16 1 The
standard set forth in Pearson resulted in confusion as to the
Kirwin, One Arrow in the Quiver-Using Civil Commitment as One Component of a State's
Response to Sexual Violence, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1135, 1138 (2003).
258. Ch. 369, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws at 712-13.
259. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
260. Id. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.
261. See id. Upholding the constitutionality of the PP statute, the Minnesota
Supreme Court revisited the Pearson test in In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.
1994). In Blodgett, the court reaffirmed the use of the Pearson psychopathic
personality definition and indicated that when identifying "a volitional
dysfunction," courts should consider:
the nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the degree of violence
involved, the relationship (or lack thereof) between the offender and
the victims, the offender's attitude and mood, the offender's medical
and family history, the results of psychological and psychiatric testing
and evaluation, and such factors that bear on the predatory sex
impulse and the lack of power to control it.
Id. at 915.
[Vol. 41:3
41
Massopust and Borrelli: "A Perfect Storm": Minnesota's Sex Offender Program—More Than Twe
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
MINNESOTA'S SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM
meaning and scope of the Pearson requirements, and sparked
significant litigation. Three Minnesota state court cases are
particularly important here because they prompted the enactment
of Minnesota's "sexually dangerous person law"-In re LinehanS262 T -i 263 - T -o • 264
(Linehan 1), In re Rickmyer, and In re Schwenznger.
In Linehan I, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
reach and application of the PP statute.26 5 In 1992, Dennis Linehan
was committed indefinitely to the Minnesota Security Hospital as a
psychopathic personality under the PP statute.2 66 Linehan appealed
his commitment arguing "that the record fail[ed] to support, by
clear and convincing evidence, the utter lack of control" element
217articulated in Pearson. The court agreed, reversing and vacating
Linehan's commitment.
2 68
The Linehan I outcome raised concerns regarding the reach of
the PP statute, which fueled the need for reform. Specifically, the
decision left the Pearson distinction between "uncontrolled desire
269and uncontrollable desire" unclear. In other words, it remained
262. 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
263. 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994).
264. 520 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
265. Linehan 1, 518 N.W.2d at 610.
266. Id.
267. Id. Linehan additionally argued that the record failed to support the
prediction of harm element articulated by Pearson. Id. But because the court found
that the county failed to prove the utter lack of control element, the court
declined to rule on the likeliness of future dangerous behavior. Id. at 614. The
court did, however, enumerate a series of factors courts should consider in
predicting serious danger to the public:
(a) the person's relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person's history of violent behavior (paying
particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts);
(c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior among individuals of this
person's background (e.g., data showing the rate at which rapists
recidivate, the correlation between age and criminal sexual activity,
etc.); (d) the sources of stress in the environment (cognitive and
affective factors which indicate that the person may be predisposed to
cope with stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity
of the present or future context to those contexts in which the person
has used violence in the past; and (f) the person's record with respect
to sex therapy programs.
Id.
268. Id.
269. See Marna J. Johnson, Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality and
Sexually Dangerous Person Statute: Throwing Away the Key, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
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unclear whether evidence of "planful" and "controlled" behavior
would undercut the "utter lack of control" element articulated in
Pearson.27 °
In re Rickmyer, decided on the same day as Linehan I, dealt with
the issue of what conduct would be harmful enough to warrant
commitment under the PP statute.2 ' In Rickmyer, Richard Rickmyer
appealed his PP commitment, arguing that as a "non-violent
pedophile," he should not be considered a psychopathic,. 72
personality. The court agreed, reasoning that the record did not
support a finding that Rickmyer had inflicted or was likely to inflict
misconduct of such an egregious nature that there was a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or mental harm on his victims.
2
11
While the court found Rickmyer's "unauthorized sexual 'touchings'
and 'spankings' . . . repellent," the court determined that the
conduct did not "constitute the kind of injury, pain, 'or other evil'
that is contemplated by the psychopathic personality statute," even
though the experts in the case agreed that Rickmyer would
continue to present a danger to others and would continue to
engage in sexual contact with children. Under the Rickmyer
decision, it remained unclear what conduct would be harmful
enough to warrant civil commitment under the PP statute.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in In re Schweninger
further confused the reach of the PP statute. 75 Interpreting
Rickmyer, the Schweninger court held that James Schweninger-a
pedophile with a lengthy history of sexually inappropriate behavior
toward young boys including bribery, mutual fondling, exposure,
and oral sex-could not be committed absent a showing of
276violence. In addition, interpreting Linehan I, the appeals court
held that, because Schweninger planned and plotted his
misconduct, he did not have "such an utter lack of power to control
277[his] behavior" as to warrant PP commitment.
1139 (1996); Dawn J. Post, Preventive Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in
Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. &
POL'v 177 (1999).
270. See Linehan 1, 518 N.W.2d at 612-13.
271. In reRickmyer, 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994).
272. Id. at 189.
273. Id. at 190.
274. Id.
275. 520 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
276. Id. at 447, 450.
277. Id. at 450.
[Vol. 41:3
43
Massopust and Borrelli: "A Perfect Storm": Minnesota's Sex Offender Program—More Than Twe
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
MINNESOTA'S SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM
Linehan I, Rickmyer, and Schweninger fueled the confusion
regarding what conduct would be harmful enough to warrant
commitment under the PP statute and whether any person could
ever really have an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses.
As a result of these decisions, the Minnesota legislature enacted the
Sexually Dangerous Persons (SDP) Act in 1994, creating a new class
of individuals eligible for civil commitment.278 The SDP Act is a
departure from the PP Act in two substantive ways.
First, the new statute clarified the confusion resulting from the
Pearson utter lack of control element and the Linehan I decision.
Namely, the SDP Act does not require proof that the sexually
dangerous person cannot control his or her sexual impulses.2
z9
Second, the new statute describes the conduct in which the patient
280must have engaged before civil commitment is warranted.
Borrowing from Rickmyer, the statute defined "harmful sexual
conduct" to mean "sexual conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another. " 2 1 In
addition to the Rickmyer language, the statute created a rebuttable
presumption of harm for conduct described by certain criminal
offenses.8 2
In conjunction with the SDP Act, the legislature amended the
PP statute without any substantive changes. The PP statute was
renamed "sexual psychopathic personality" (SPP), and moved to
284the Civil Commitment Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 253B 8. The
Pearson utter lack of control element was incorporated into the SPP
278. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18b (1994) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 253D, subdiv. 16 (2014)).
279. Id. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18b(b) (1994) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 253D, subdiv. 16 (2014)); In re Linehan (Linehan II1), 557 N.W.2d 171, 179
(Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), affd as modified, 594
N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
280. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18b (1994) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 253D, subdiv. 16 (2014)) (defining a "sexually dangerous person"); see also
Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 179 (discussing the definition of a "sexually dangerous
person" as delineated in the 1994 version of the SDP Act).
281. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 7a(a) (1994) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 253D, subdiv. 8(a) (2014)).
282. Id. § 253B.02, subdiv. 7a(b) (1994).
283. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 179 ("[T]he operation of the SDP Act is
substantially the same as the PP Act ... [and] the civil commitment procedures
are similar under the SDP Act and the PP Act.").
284. Act of Aug. 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, §§ 1-3, art. 2, § 29, 1994 Minn. Laws 1st
Spec. Sess. 5, 6-7, 26.
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Act: "'Sexual psychopathic personality' means the existence in
any person of such conditions . . . which render the person
irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if
the person has evidenced.., an utter lack of power to control the
person's sexual impulses."
'25
Since its enactment in 1994, the courts have interpreted and
refined the SDP Act on several significant instances. First, shortly
after the law's enactment, the county again petitioned to commit
Linehan in Linehan III, but this time under the new SDP Act. 
2 8
Linehan in turn challenged his commitment on two grounds. First,
he argued that the commitment violated his substantive due
process and equal protection rights under the Minnesota and U.S.
Constitutions, and his rights against ex post facto laws and double• . . 287
jeopardy under the U.S. Constitution. Second, Linehan argued
that if the court found his commitment constitutional, then the
district court erred in finding that it was highly likely that he would
288engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the SDP statute and Linehan's commitment.28 9 In reaching its
conclusion, the court reasoned that:
[(1)] an utter inability to control one's sexual impulses
was not integral to narrowly tailoring the SDP Act to meet
substantive due process requirements, . . . [ (2)] that
distinguishing between sexually dangerous persons with
and without mental disorders did not offend equal
protection... [, and (3) that] the SDP Act was adjudged a
civil and not a criminal law, and therefore held not to
implicate the double jeopardy or ex post facto
doctrines.29°
In addition, the court rejected the argument that "likely" in
the SDP statute means "more likely than not" or at least a "50.1%
probability. ''291 Instead, the court defined the term "likely" in thedefinition of an SDP to mean "highly likely" and held, as a result,
285. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18a (1994) (cutrent version at MINN.
STAT. § 253D, subdiv. 15 (2014)).
286. See Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 174.
287. Id. at 174-75.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 191.
290. In re Linehan (Linehan V), 594 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1999).
291. Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 180.
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that "likely" requires the petitioner to show by clear and convincing
evidence that future hanriful conduct is "highly likely.,
29 2
Shortly after Linehan Ill was decided, the United States
293Supreme Court issued its decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, whereby
Hendricks challenged his civil commitment under a Kansas statute
providing for civil commitment of sexually violent predators.
Hendricks argued that his civil commitment violated his substantive
due process rights, and that the Kansas statute established criminal
proceedings in violation of the ban on double jeopardy and ex post
facto laws.294 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that
the Kansas Act "comports with due process requirements and
neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an
exercise of impermissible ex post facto lawmaking. '"2 95 In reviewing
the substantive due process claim,
the Supreme Court noted that states have civilly confined
certain persons since the late 18th century. However, the
Court clarified that it had sustained civil commitment
statutes when the statutes "have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor,
such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.' These
added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary
civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control."
296
Under this scheme, the Supreme Court upheld the Kansas
statute against Hendricks' due process challenge. In addition, the
Supreme Court determined that Kansas' commitment proceeding
was civil in nature and therefore, Hendricks' double jeopardy and
291ex post facto claims could not stand. 2
In light of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Hendricks, the Minnesota Supreme Court vacated the judgment in
Linehan III, and remanded it for reconsideration based on the
292. Id.
293. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
294. Id. at 350.
295. Id. at 371.
296. Linehan T, 594 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 357-58).
297. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
298. Id. at 368-71.
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Hendricks decision. 299 The Minnesota Supreme Court again upheld
the constitutionality of the SDP law, imposing a narrowing
construction to the SDP Act based on Hendricks.30 0 Linehan argued
that the SDP Act violated substantive due process, as interpreted by
Hendricks, because the Act "does not sufficiently narrow the class of
targeted persons because it dispenses with the need to prove that a
person has an utter inability to control his or her sexual impulses
before allowing indeterminate civil commitment" (i.e., the Pearson
standard) .30' The court rejected this position, reasoning that while
Hendricks requires a showing of some volitional impairment, it does
not mandate the "utter lack of control" standard set forth in
Pearson: 2 Instead, the court held that under Hendricks,
the SDP Act allows civil commitment of sexually
dangerous persons who have engaged in a prior course of
sexually harmful behavior and whose present disorder or
dysfunction does not allow them to adequately control
their sexual impulses, making it highly likel y that they will
engage in harmful sexual acts in the future.
The court also rejected Linehan's arguments related to his
double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges, finding that
Hendricks supports its earlier Linehan III decision that the SDP Act
does not contravene the double jeopardy and ex post facto
clauses. The United States Supreme Court denied Linehan's
certiorari petition35
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court revisited the
Hendricks decision in a second Kansas case, Kansas v. Crane, 0 6 which
clarified the Court's holding in Hendricks. In Crane, Michael Crane
challenged his commitment making the same argument Linehan
did in Linehan V-that Hendricks required the State to show that
the person has a complete inability to control his or her behavior.0 7
The Court disagreed, holding that Hendricks set forth no
requirement of total or complete lack of control:
299. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 871.
300. See id. at 878.
301. Id. at 872.
302. Id. at 875-76.
303. Id. at 876.
304. Id. at 871-72.
305. Linehan v. Minnesota, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999).
306. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
307. Id. at 410-11.
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[W]e recognize that in cases where lack of control is at
issue, "inability to control behavior" will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough
to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of
such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric
diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality
itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case.'08
Following the United States Supreme Court's Crane decision,
Linehan once again challenged his commitment in an Eighth
Circuit habeas corpus case, Linehan v. Milczark.309 In his appeal,
Linehan argued that the SDP Act does not meet federal substantive
due process standards because the "lack of adequate control"
standard articulated in Linehan IVis broader than the test set by the
Supreme Court in Hendricks and later clarified in crane.1 Denying
Linehan's habeas corpus petition, the Eighth Circuit read Crane to
require an express finding of some level of inability to control
behavior but not, as Linehan continued to argue, an "utter lack of
control. '.' Specifically, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the validity of
the Linehan /Vstandard, holding:
The standard enunciated in Linehan IV requires a finding
of "lack of adequate control" in relation to a properly
diagnosed disorder or dysfunction, as well as findings of
past sexual violence and resultant likelihood of future
sexually dangerous behavior. This combination of
required findings will adequately distinguish an offender
subject to civil commitment, who has difficulty controlling
his behavior because of a disorder or dysfunction, from
the more typical offender with behavioral problems, who
is best dealt with in the criminal system. The SDP Act
standard, as narrowed by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Linehan IV therefore adequately distinguishes between
308. Id. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997)).
309. 315 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2003).
310. Id. at 925.
311. Id.
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the typical recidivist and the dangerous sex offender and
complies with substantive due process requirements. " '
The Minnesota Supreme Court most recently addressed
constitutional challenges to the SDP Act in In re Civil Commitment of
Ince.31 3 In Ince, the court reversed the commitment of Cedrick Ince.
In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed and refined
the principles first announced in the Linehan III decision, namely
that "the risk of harmful sexual conduct occurring must be 'highly
likely' based on consideration of the Linehan factors and all
relevant evidence. 31 4 The court acknowledged that "'highly likely'
cannot be defined by a numeric value," and that "the risk of error
in commitment proceedings stems from the challenge of
attempting to predict the future conduct of an individual."' [5 But
the court stressed that adopting a numeric value will not change
the difficulties in predicting the likelihood of future behavior.:
16
Instead, the court emphasized that a "highly likely standard,
particularly when coupled with a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard, provides a necessary degree of confidence in that
prediction.,
31
1
Because the court could not determine whether the district
court adhered to the Linehan factors to determine that the risk of
harmful sexual conduct was "highly likely," the court concluded
that a remand was necessary." In addition, because the court
remanded to the district court, it did not address Ince's argument
that he met his burden of proof to show the existence of a less
restrictive alternative under Minnesota Statutes section 253B.185,
subdivision 1(d) .319 The court did note, however, that it had not
previously addressed the necessity or nature of findings of fact on
the availability of a less restrictive alternative, and suggested, as a
result, that "findings of fact on a proposed less restrictive
alternative will no doubt contribute to meaningful appellate review
and confidence in the decision."
320
312. Id. at 927.
313. 847 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
314. Id. at 26.
315. Id. at 21.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 25.
319. Id. at 25-26 n.5.
320. Id. at 26.
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B. State Court Opinions Regarding Wisconsin's Sex Offender
Commitment Statute
Wisconsin's "Sexual Predator Law" was enacted in 1994 to
permit the State to classify persons as sexually violent and commit
them to a civil treatment facility."' Since its enactment, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has heard a number of cases challenging
the constitutionality of the law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court first
ruled on the constitutionality of Wisconsin's sexual predator statute
in 1995 based on two companion cases-State v. Posd2 2 and State v.
Carpenter.323 In Post, the court addressed substantive due process
challenges.121 In Carpenter, the court focused on double jeopardy
and ex post facto challenges.325
In Post, after the state petitioned for the commitment of Ben
Oldakowski and Samuel Post, both Post and Oldakowski moved to
dismiss the chapter 980 petitions, citing equal protection, double
jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process violations. 11 0 ldakowski
and Post argued that their due process rights were violated
"because chapter 980 allows commitment: (1) without a showing of
mental illness; (2) without an individualized showing of
amenability to treatment; and (3) with an insufficient showing of1 .,327
dangerousness., The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and
upheld the constitutionality of chapter 980, finding that: (1) "the
term 'mental disorder' as defined in chapter 980 satisfies the
mental condition component required by substantive due process,,328
for involuntary mental commitment, (2) the state is statutorily
321. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-14 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380).
Wisconsin originally committed sex offenders under a sexual psychopath statute-
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 975.001-.18 (Westlaw) (repealed in part in 1980)-whereby
commitments were in lieu of incarceration.
322. 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995).
323. 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995).
324. The court deferred to its companion case, Carpenter, on the double
jeopardy and ex post facto issues: "We hold that chapter 980 does not violate the
constitution on either double jeopardy or ex post facto grounds. Our decision on
these two challenges is controlled by the opinion issued today in the companion
case, State v. Carpenter." Post, 541 N.W.2d at 118 (citation omitted).
325. See Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 107.
326. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 119-20.
327. Id. at 122.
328. Id. In its reasoning, the court explained that "'mental illness' is not
required by either the federal or state constitution and the Supreme Court has
declined to enunciate a single definition that must be used as the mental
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obligated to provide control, care, and treatment to those
determined to be sexually violent persons, and Post and
Oldakowski failed to present "any precedent in which 'treatability'
was held to be a constitutional prerequisite to commitment, ' ' 3 and
(3) "that although predictions of future dangerousness may be
difficult, they are still an attainable, in fact essential, part of our
judicial process."30
Post and Oldakowski also challenged chapter 980 on the basis
that it denied them equal protection.3 ' Specifically, Post and
Oldakowski argued that several sections of chapter 51 (Wisconsin's
Mental Health Act) and chapter 980 were substantively different,
and that these differences violated equal protection. 3" As a
threshold matter, the court determined that persons committed
under chapters 51 and 980 are similarly situated for purposes of an
equal protection comparison. The court declined to resolve the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied in the case, finding that
all but one of the disparities in chapter 980 passed the highest level
of scrutiny: "The state's compelling interest in protecting the
public provides the necessary justification for the differential
treatment of the class of sexually violent persons whose mental
disorders make them distinctively dangerous because of the
substantial probability that they will commit future crimes of sexual
violence."
33 1
condition sufficient for involuntary mental commitments." Id. at 123. The court
added:
The key to the constitutionality of the definition of mental disorder in
chapter 980 is that it requires a nexus-persons will not fall within
chapter 980's reach unless they are diagnosed with a disorder that has
the specific effect of predisposing them to engage in acts of sexual
violence. Not all persons who commit sexually violent crimes can be
diagnosed as suffering from mental disorders, nor are all persons with
a mental disorder predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses.
Id. at 124.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 126. The court reasoned that it had "refused to proscribe strict
boundaries for legislative determinations of what degree of dangerousness is
necessary for involuntary commitment." Id. (footnote omitted).
331. Id. at 128.
332. Id. at 118.
333. Id. at 128-29.
334. Id. at 130.
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Addressing the differences between chapter 51 and chapter
980, the court concluded that there was no justification for the
distinction in chapter 51, which provides for jury trials at discharge
hearings, and chapter 980, which does not. As a result, the court
held that "equal protection demands that a right to a jury trial be
made available at [discharge hearings]."
The court addressed the double jeopardy and ex post facto
issues in Post's companion case, State v. Carpenter 7 The
respondents in Carpenter (and Post) argued that chapter 980 is
3381 339violative of the double jeopardy s and ex post facto clauses of the
United States Constitution because it subjects them to multiple
punishments for the same underlying offense and makes more
burdensome the punishment for their past sexual offenses. In
concluding that chapter 980 did not violate either the ex post facto
or double jeopardy clause, the court held "that ch[apter] 980
creates a civil commitment procedure primarily intended to protect
the public and to provide concentrated treatment to convicted
sexually violent persons, not to punish the sexual offender.,
341
Two years after Post and Carpenter were decided, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court issued opinions in two more companion cases, In re
Commitment of Curied42 and In re Commitment of Kienitz, 343 which
335. Id. at 132-33.
336. Id. The court stressed "that this conclusion is not fatal to the statute
itself," as the court "has previously construed deficient statutes to include
constitutionally required procedures." Id. at 133 (citing State ex reL Terry v.
Schubert, 247 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Wis. 1976), vacated, 434 U.S. 808, reinstated as
modified, 290 N.W.2d 713 (Wis. 1980)).
337. 541 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1995).
338. Id. at 109 ("The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 'the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.'"
(quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989))).
339. Id. at 113 ("An ex post facto law is any law 'which punishes as a crime an
act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives
one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when
the act was committed .... '" (quoting State v. Thiel, 524 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Wis.
1994))).
340. See id. at 109, 113.
341. Id. at 107.
342. 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1999).
343. 597 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1999).
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further clarified the reach of chapter 980. The two cases articulated
the definition and application of "substantially probable 3 44 as used
in chapter 980. In Curiel, the court defined "'substantially
probable,' construed according to its common and appropriate
usage, [to] mean[] 'much more likely than not.'
345
In Kienitz, the court applied the "much more likely than not"
definition of "substantially probable" as defined in Curiel and held
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a commitment order
even though expert testimony indicated that Kienitz's chances of
recidivism were only between forty-four and fifty-eight percent.46
The court supplemented its reliance on expert testimony with lay
witness testimony to determine that it was substantially probable
that Kienitz would engage in future acts of sexual violence.
Similar to Minnesota, following the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Hendricks and Crane, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court revisited the constitutionality of chapter 980 in In re
Commitment of Laxton148 and In re Commitment of Rachel.149 In Laxton,
the petitioner argued that chapter 980 is "unconstitutional because,
in determining that an individual is sexually violent and subject to
civil commitment, the provisions of [chapter 980] do not require a
jury to determine that the person has a mental disorder that
involves serious difficulty in controlling his or her behavior."50 Like
the Supreme Court in Crane, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Laxton attempted to outline a clear standard by which a fact finder
could establish that an individual suffered from some degree of
volitional impairment to justify commitment. Relying on the Crane
analysis, the court again held that chapter 980 is not violative of
substantive due process."' Specifically, the court concluded:
344. Under former chapter 980, subdivision (7), a sexually violent person was
defined as "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.., and
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes
it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence."
Wis. STAT. § 980.01(7) (1993), available at http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1993
/statutes/statutes/980.pdf.
345. In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d at 699.
346. In re Commitment of Kienitz, 597 N.W.2d at 714-15.
347. Id. at 716.
348. 2002 WI 82, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784.
349. 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762.
350. In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82 1, 254 Wis. 2d at 188, 647
N.W.2d at 786.
351. Id. 2, 254 Wis. 2d at 189-90, 647 N.W.2d at 786-87.
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[Sluch a civil commitment does not require a separate
finding that the individual's mental disorder involves
serious difficulty for such person to control his or her
behavior. The requisite proof of lack of control is
established when the nexus between such person's mental
disorder and dangerousness has been established.
Specifically, we conclude that evidence showing that the
person's mental disorder predisposes such individual to
engage in acts of sexual violence, and evidence
establishing a substantial probability that such person will
again commit such acts, necessarily and implicitly includes
proof that such person's mental disorder involves serious
difficulty in controlling his or her behavior. Such
evidence distinguishes such a person from the dangerous
but typical recidivist. 1
2
In Rachel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again upheld the
constitutionality of chapter 980. The court addressed the effect of
the 1999 amendments on the constitutionality of chapter 980,
"which primarily served to limit a ch[apter] 980 respondent's
352. Id.
353. In re Commitment of Rachel, 2002 WI 81 1,254 Wis. 2d at 219, 647 N.W.2d
at 764.
354. Id. 14-15, 254 Wis. 2d at 225-27, 647 N.W.2d at 768 ("As a whole, the
consequence of these amendments was to limit the ch. 980 respondent's ability to
obtain supervised release when the respondent is found to be a sexually violent
person. Under the old statutory scheme, the circuit court could order
commitment to supervised release immediately after trial under Wis. Stat.
§ 980.06(2) (1997-98), and the individual could petition for supervised release
after six months of institutional placement under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) (1997-98).
Under the new formulation, the circuit court no longer has the option to order
commitment directly to supervised release after trial, Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (1999-
2000); and the individual can only petition for supervised release after 18 months
of institutional placement under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) (1999-2000). Under both
the old and the new schemes, however, the director of the institution at which the
individual is placed may still petition on the individual's behalf for supervised
release at any time under 980.08(1); and the court can still order a reexamination
at any time Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3). Additionally, under both schemes, the
individual can petition for discharge under Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09(2) and 980.10; and
the Wisconsin secretary of health and family services ("the Secretary") may
authorize the person to petition for discharge at any time Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1).
Under both the old and new schemes, the individual is entitled to a periodic
reexamination no later than six months after commitment, under Wis. Stat.
§ 980.07(1), and is entitled to subsequent periodic reexaminations at least once
each 12 months thereafter.").
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ability to seek supervised release. 3 5 5 Rachel challenged the
amended statute on a number of constitutional grounds, including
violations of double jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process.356 The
court held that the amendments limiting an offender's ability to
seek supervised release as an alternative to institutional
commitment did not violate Rachel's constitutional rights.
357
Relying again on United States Supreme Court precedent in
Hendricks, the Wisconsin court also held that the amended statute
was not criminal or punitive in nature, and consequently, did not
158violate either the double jeopardy or ex post facto clauses. In
addition, the court looked to its decision in Post to reaffirm its
holding that the amendments to chapter 980 still serve "the
legitimate and compelling state interest of providing treatment to
the dangerously mentally ill and protecting the public from the
dangerously mentally ill, and that the statute is still narrowly
tailored to meet those interests.,
359
C. State Court Opinions Regarding New York's Sex Offender Commitment
Statute
New York's civil confinement statute, the Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA), was passed by the
legislature in 2007 o. Prior to SOMTA's passage, New York Mental
Hygiene Law section 9.27(a) governed involuntary civil
confinement.36' The law did not apply specifically to sex offenders,
355. Id. 1, 254 Wis. 2d at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 764.
356. Id. 2, 254 Wis. 2d at 219, 647 N.W.2d at 764.
357. Id. 69, 254 Wis. 2d at 249-50, 647 N.W.2d at 779.
358. Id. 18, 254 Wis. 2d at 228, 647 N.W.2d at 768.
359. Id. 68, 254 Wis. 2d at 249, 647 N.W.2d at 779.
360. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 10.00 (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2014, chs.
I to 550).
361. See id. § 9.27 (Westlaw). The need for the civil confinement of sex
offenders was highlighted following the murder of a fifty-six-year-old woman in
Westchester, New York by a Level 3 sex offender who had been released from
prison two years earlier. Allison Morgan, Civil Confinement of Sex Offenders: New
York's Attempt to Push the Envelope in the Name of Public Safety, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1001,
1021-22 (2006). Following this event, Westchester attorney Jeanine Pirro,
Westchester County Executive Andrew Spano, and New York Governor George
Pataki fiercely advocated for a civil confinement statute for sex offenders, but the
state legislature did not act to pass a civil confinement law. Id. at 1021-23. In
response, Governor Pataki ordered the civil confinement of sex offenders under
section 9.27(a) of the New York Mental Hygiene Law. Id. at 1023-24.
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but to the mentally ill.362 As applied to sex offenders, the
unconventional use of the New York Mental Hygiene Law section
9.27 quickly resulted in a lawsuit-State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio
(Harkavy 1) 63-which motivated the creation of today's sex
offender commitment statute, New York Mental Hygiene Law
article 10.
In Harkavy I, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS) filed a
petition for habeas corpus, seeking the immediate release of sex
offenders who had been transferred to the mental health system
pursuant to article 9.' 64 According to petitioners, among the
problems associated with the application of New York Mental
Hygiene Law article 9 to sex offenders was the law's apparent
overruling of Correction Law section 402.365 Under Correction Law
section 402, an inmate is required to have ajudicial hearing before
commitment.36 6 Under New York Mental Hygiene Law article 9, a
judicial hearing is not required. As a result, the question in
Harkavy I became whether the procedures set forth in Correction
Law section 402, rather than New York Mental Hygiene Law article
9, applied.16 The petitioners argued that at the time they were
evaluated for involuntary commitment and eventually committed,
they were undergoing prison sentences, requiring the state to
follow Correction Law section 402.369 The court agreed, finding that
"in the absence of a clear legislative directive in regard to inmates
nearing their release from incarceration, . . . Correction Law
[section] 402 [was] the appropriate method for evaluating an
362. See MENTAL HYG. § 9.27 (Westlaw).
363. Harkavy 1, 859 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 2006).
364. Id. at 610.
365. Id. at 610-11.
366. Id. at 612.
367. See id. ("The commitment procedures of Correction Law § 402 differ
from Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27 in that Correction Law § 402 requires that the
prison superintendent must first apply to a court for the appointment of two
examining physicians to conduct psychiatric examinations of the inmate (see
Correction Law § 402[1]), and if they certify that the inmate is mentally ill and in
need of psychiatric care and treatment, then the superintendent must petition the
court for a commitment order (see Correction Law § 402[3]) .... The inmate is
then entitled to request a hearing before a judge before the transfer to a
psychiatric hospital is undertaken (see Correction Law § 402 [5]).").
368. Id. at 610.
369. Id.
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inmate for postrelease involuntary commitment to a mental
facility."
370
The Harkavy I decision emphasized the need for a specific sex
offender statute in New York and, as a result, SOMTA was enacted
shortly thereafter.317 Decided a year after Harkavy I, State ex. rel
Harkavy v. Consilvio (Harkavy I1) 3 1 gave the New York Court of
Appeals its first opportunity to decide the constitutionality of
SOMTA, which was passed while Harkavy I was pending. But
because the petitioners only challenged their commitment under
article 9, the court did not address the constitutional merits of
SOMTA. Instead, similar to the petitioners in Harkavy I, the
petitioners in Harkavy II argued that their "civil commitment
pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9 was not statutorily
permissible," and that their commitment to a secure facility
violated due process and equal protection. The court
acknowledged that neither Correction Law section 402 nor New
York Mental Hygiene Law article 9 was specifically designed to114
address sex offenders. But after the Harkavy I decision, "the
[1]egislature filled the statutory void, enacting a legislative scheme
designed to address the civil confinement of certain classes of
inmates [including sex offenders] completing their terms of
imprisonment. 7 5 Dismissing petitioners' constitutional challenges
to placement in a secure facility, the court held that the relevant
statutory provisions in SOMTA satisfy the standard for confinement
in a secure facility. As a result, the court held that, in light of the
new legislation, petitioners were entitled to a new hearing in
accordance with SOMTA.
377
Following Harkavy II, SOMTA has largely escaped judicial
scrutiny from New York's highest court, but a number of decisions
have shaped the application of SOMTA. Specifically, a line of cases
brought by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service have discussed due
370. Id. at 614.
371. Sex Offender Management Treatment Act, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST.
SERVICES, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/legalservices/ch7_som.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2015).
372. 8 N.Y.3d 645 (2007).
373. Id. at 649.
374. See id. at 652 ("We conclude that those hearings will be conducted in
accordance with article 10.").
375. Id. at 651.
376. Id. at 652-53.
377. Id. at 652.
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process requirements regarding article 10, commitment and
378
treatment.
In the same year SOMTA was enacted, the case of Mental
Hygiene Legal Service v. Spitzer (MHLS 1) challenged the
constitutionality of various provisions of the Act. Plaintiffs filed a
declaratory action attacking the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the Act, and subsequently moved for a preliminary
injunction.3 s0  Plaintiffs did not challenge the substantive
constitutionality of SOMTA, but instead focused on particular
provisions, contending that the Act "failfed] to provide the
requisite procedural safeguards necessary to comport with the
constitutional command that persons may not be deprived of
liberty without due process of law" and that certain aspects of the
Act denied "individuals subject to [the Act] ... equal protection of
laws [as] guaranteed by the Constitution."
3
8
The plaintiffs specifically challenged New York Mental
Hygiene Law sections:
10.06(f), which authorizes the New York Attorney General
to issue a "securing petition" to detain certain individuals
beyond the completion of their term of imprisonment, in
advance of the probable cause hearing, without notice or
opportunity for review;
• . . 10.06(k), which mandates involuntary civil detention
pending the commitment trial, based on a finding at the
probable cause hearing that the individual may have a
mental abnormality, without a finding of current
dangerousness;
378. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo (MHLS I1), 13 F. Supp. 3d 289,
292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo (MHLS I1), 785 F.
Supp. 2d 205, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer
(MHLS I), No. 07 civ. 2935(GEL), 2007 WL 4115936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2007), affd sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson, No. 07-5548-CV, 2009
WL 579445 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009).
379. MHLS1, 2007 WL 4115936, at *1.
380. Id.
381. Id.; see also id. at *6. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 369-71 (1997), the MHLS Icourt noted: "Plaintiffs do
not challenge New York's authority to involuntarily commit individuals who have
in the past committed sexual crimes and are at present mentally ill and dangerous.
Nor can they, because the Supreme Court has held that such detention is
constitutionally authorized." MHLS I, 2007 WL 4115936, at *6.
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. . . 10.06(j) (iii), which forbids an individual indicted
for a crime but found incompetent to stand trial to
contest the commission of the acts that constituted the
crime at the probable cause hearing;
. . . 10.07(d), which authorizes civil commitment for
persons found incompetent to stand trial and never
convicted of any offense based on a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that they committed the sexual
offense with which they were charged;
. . . 10.07(c), which authorizes the factfinder at the
commitment trial to make a retroactive determination by
clear and convincing evidence that certain non-sex crimes
were committed with a "sexual[] motivat[ion];" [and]
. . . 10.05(e), which authorizes certain pre-hearing
psychiatric examinations, in the absence of counsel, of
individuals subject to the Act."
The court granted plaintiffs preliminary injunction with respect to
sections 10.06(k) and 10.07(d)."'
The court found that plaintiffs had "demonstrated irreparable
injury as well as a likelihood of success in demonstrating that
[section] 10.06(k) is unconstitutional insofar as it permits civil
detention pending trial without an individualized finding of
current dangerousness. ""' In its reasoning, the court explained
that " It] he Supreme Court has never held that an individual can be
detained for a substantial period of time based on mental
incapacity alone."38 5 The court held that "[d]ue process 'does not
tolerate the involuntary confinement of [a] nondangerous
individual.""" The court articulated that, inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent,
[section] 10.06(k) extends automatic detention to all
individuals who may receive treatment subject to Article
10, without a judicial proceeding to determine
dangerousness, and with no rational basis for determining
whether the particular individual would pose a danger to
the community if released. New York may not
382. Id. at *1-2.
383. Id. at *29.
384. Id. at *2.
385. Id. at *14.
386. Id. (quoting Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 972 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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automatically detain any individual who may be subject to
the statute for a significant period of time without proving
that there is at least probable cause to believe that he is
387dangerous.
The court also found that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated irreparable injury as well as a likelihood of
success in demonstrating that . . . [section] 10.07(d) is
unconstitutional insofar as it allows detention of
individuals after the commitment trial absent a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that such individuals
committed the acts which constituted the crime for which
they had been charged:""
In its reasoning, the court acknowledged that the "vast
majority of persons subject to the Act [had] been found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed at least one
crime., 38 9 But, the court explained, the Act also authorizes the
detention for two other groups who had not been found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt to have connitted a crime.:' The first
group consists of individuals who, while found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt to have committed a crime, were also found not
guilty by mental disease or defect:"" The second group includes
individuals who were charged with sex offenses but were found by
the court to have been so incapacitated as to have been unable to
stand trial. ' 2 The court held that due process
requires that when an individual is subject to the stigma of
being labeled a "sexual offender" and of finding that he
violated a criminal law triggering the possibility of
institutional confinement, proof that he in fact committed
the acts that form the basis for being labeled an
"offender" must be made beyond a reasonable doubt: 3
Relying on the analysis in MHLS I, the Southern District of
New York revisited and reaffirmed the MHLS I holding, finding
that sections 10.06(k) and 10.07(d) were facially unconstitutional
387. Id. at *15.
388. Id. at *2.
389. Id. at *17.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at *21.
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in Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Cuomo (MHLS I1).39' Three years
later, in Melendez v. Schneiderman, the Northern District of New York
clarified its holding in MHLS I and MHLS II regarding section
10.06(k).' 5 In Melendez, the plaintiff argued that he was held
beyond his maximum release, without a hearing, based upon
section 10.06(k), in violation of the injunctions issued in MHLS I
and MHLS 1/,396 The court disagreed, holding that the plaintiff took
an "overly simplified view" of the court's ruling in MLS I and
MHLS I. 397 Specifically, the district court noted that neither
decision invalidated section 10.06(k) altogether. "  Instead, the
court maintained:
Rather that [sic] prohibiting use of the section altogether,
the court specifically enjoined enforcement of section
10.06(k) absent a specific, individualized finding of
probable cause to believe that a person is sufficiently
dangerous to require confinement, and that lesser
conditions of supervision will not suffice to protect the
public during the pendency of the proceedings.99
The court determined that, in Melendez, it had made the
required dangerousness finding and thus did not violate MHLS I or
MHLS 11.
400
But in another recent case, State v. Nelson,01 the court refused
to follow the MHLS line of cases regarding section 10.07(d).
402
394. 785 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated, Mental Hyg. Legal
Servs. v. Schneiderman, 472 F. App'x 45, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Melendez v.
Schneiderman, Civil Action No. 9:13-cv-622 [GLS/ATB], 2014 WL 2154536, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014) ("[A]lthough the Second Circuit affirmed the
preliminary injunction, it later reversed the court's order granting a permanent
injunction and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
[Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS)] had standing to pursue the action on
behalf of its clients, who were respondents in the MHL proceedings. MHLS v.
Schneiderman, 472 F. App'x 45 (2d Cir. 2012). On remand, the District Court found
that MHLS did not have standing to pursue the respondents' claims and dismissed
the action. MHLS v. Cuomo (MHLS III), No. 07 Civ. 2935 (DAB), 2014 WL 1245891
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014).").
395. Metendez, 2014 WL 2154536, at *9.
396. Id. at *4.
397. Id.
398. Id. at *3.
399. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
400. Id.
401. 932 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
402. Id. at 44-45; see also State v. Farnsworth, 900 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. App.
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Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the Nelson
court found that, because article 10 does not impose criminal
detention or other punitive consequences,0 due process is satisfied
where the state proves by "clear and convincing evidence," rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct underlying the
404conviction was sexually motivated. As evidenced by the split
among the lower courts, these issues are ripe for determination by
New York's highest court.
In addition to procedural due process claims, New York courts
have analyzed the question of whether SOMTA violates the ex post
facto or the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution. Relying
on Supreme Court precedent, including Hendricks and Crane, the
Court of Appeals of New York has recognized that SOMTA is not a
penal statute, but rather one with a remedial purpose, and as a
result, does not violate the ex post facto or double jeopardy clauses• • 405 r 4116
of the U.S. Constitution. In Nelson, for example, the New York
County Supreme Court addressed the defendant's claim that
SOMTA retroactively transformed his non-sex felony convictions
into sexually motivated felonies in violation of the ex post facto
clause."" In rejecting the claim, the court relied on Hendricks, and
determined that the proceedings under SOMTA are nonpunitive
proceedings to which the ex post facto clause is inapplicable.
The aftermath of SOMTA in New York is not as judicially
developed as the civil confinement laws in Minnesota or Wisconsin.
Moreover, case law from within New York relies heavily on Supreme
Div. 2010) (finding that the proper standard "has not been conclusively addressed
by any state court in New York, although one federal district court [MHLS 1] has
addressed that contention in the context of determining whether to grant a
preliminary injunction").
403. Nelson, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
404. Id. at 44 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
405. See In re State v. Floyd, 22 N.Y.3d 95, 103-04 (N.Y. 2013) (citing People v.
Harnett, 945 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 2011); In re State v. Enrique T., 937 N.Y.S.2d 203
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Nelson, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 42; In re State v. Daniel Oo., 928
N.Y.S.2d 787, 794-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); In re State v. Campany, 905 N.Y.S.2d
419, 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Farnsworth, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 554-60).
406. 932 N.Y.S.2d 42.
407. Id. at 42.
408. Id. at 44.
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Court precedent in rendering decisions regarding the
constitutionality of SOMTA.
D. Summary
In summary, case law from Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New
York is largely shaped by United States Supreme Court precedent.
As a result, case law governing the constitutionality of commitment
in each state does not differ significantly. Tracking with Hendricks
and Crane, courts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New York each
determined that:
" Civil commitment under each state's civil commitment statute
does not violate the ex post facto or double jeopardy
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Challenges to the
commitment statutes based on violations of ex post facto or
double jeopardy under the U.S. Constitution have been, and
will likely continue to be, routinely denied.
* An individual cannot be committed based on mental
incapacity alone.
* Civil commitment does not violate due process when the
commitment statutes couple proof of dangerousness with
proof of some additional factor such as a mental illness or
abnormality. An utter inability to control one's sexual impulses
is not required, but there must be some showing of volitional
impairment.
But some of the main differences that may be causing disparity
in the number of people committed to and people being
discharged from Minnesota versus Wisconsin or New York are the
following:
* Although the Minnesota Sex Offender statute contemplates
placement in a less restrictive alternative, there are no such
facilities available in the commitment process or upon
provisional discharge. Thus, Minnesota courts have not yet
decided issues concerning the necessity or nature of findings
of fact on the availability of a less restrictive alternative.
* Proof of dangerousness in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New
York differs slightly. In Minnesota, courts have interpreted
409. See Floyd, 22 N.Y.3d at 103-04 ("SOMTA falls squarely within the
substantive due process requirements for civil process as stated by Hendricks and
Crane.").
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"likely" in the definition of a sexually dangerous person to
mean "highly likely" that the person will engage in future
harmful conduct. Wisconsin courts have interpreted "likely" in
its definition of a sexually violent person to mean "much more
likely than not" that the person will engage in future acts of
sexual violence. The New York high court, on the other hand,
has not yet interpreted the meaning of "likely" in its definition
of a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement."
These differences play a role-albeit likely small-in
explaining the disparity between the Minnesota commitment of sex
offenders and that of other states, specifically New York and
Wisconsin.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE TREATMENT PROGRAM
A. Current Status of Minnesota's Sex Offender Program
Minnesota has the highest per capita number of civilly
committed sex offenders of any state that employs civil
commitment and it has the lowest rate of release from
commitment.4 As of January 1, 2014, Minnesota has almost 700
individuals who are civilly committed as Sexually Dangerous
Persons or Sexually Psychopathic Personalities, and who are being
housed at one of the two facilities that Minnesota currently has for
civilly committed sex offenders. 41 1 "To date no [civilly committed
sex offender] has been fully discharged from civil commitment,
while admission rates have increased dramatically since 2003. ''4 12
Only three individuals have progressed through the program
sufficient to be provisionally discharged, one of whom was returned
to the MSOP on a technical violation of his release conditions.
410. Memorandum from the Hon. Eric J. Magnuson, Chair, Sex Offender
Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force, to Lucinda E. Jesson, Comm'r, Minn.
Dep't Human Servs. (Dec. 4, 2013), available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us
/Ifserver/Public/DHS-6641B-ENG.
411. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, MINN. DEP'T HUMAN SERVICES
(Oct. 2014), https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/Ifserver/Public/DHS-5939-ENG.
412. Id.
413. See Chris Serres, 3rd Sex Offender Released, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec.
6, 2014, at IB, available at LEXIS; Brad Phenow, Release of Civilly Committed Sex
Offender to Le Center Facility Granted, LE CENTER LEADER (Dec. 5, 2014, 11:30 AM),
http://www.southernminn.com/le-center-leader/news/article_c954cc9a-ebfd
-5dee-8266-22fd6960ee5b.html.
2015]
64
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss3/3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Since 2008, the MSOP has experienced a forty-six percent growth
in its client population.' 14 The State predicts that by July 2016, the
number of civilly committed sex offenders being held in its
facilities will increase to approximately 894.'
"MSOP is one program at two locations-Moose Lake and St.
Peter.''1 6 With the exception of people receiving treatment in the
program who are cognitively disabled and housed at St. Peter,
committed individuals begin their treatment at the MSOP's Moose
Lake facility. 4 As a result, individuals involved in the initial civil
commitment process and those participating in the initial stages of
treatment are housed at Moose Lake. 418 The Moose Lake facility
also houses nonparticipants.4 9  In this facility, committed
individuals are housed in two buildings: the main building,
originally built in 1995, and Complex One, built in 2009.420
The MSOP's other location, St. Peter, houses individuals who,
according to the MSOP, "have demonstrated meaningful change"
and have progressed far enough in treatment to begin the
reintegration process. 4 2 ' These patients reside at Community
Preparation Services, which is a residential setting outside of the St.
Peter facility's secure perimeter.122 Clients may only reside at
423Community Preparation Services if granted transfer by the courts.
In addition to serving individuals at Community Preparation
Services, the St. Peter facility, which occupies four buildings on the
St. Peter campus, also provides alternative treatment for certain
committed individuals.44 This alternative treatment is provided to
individuals who are not suited for conventional programming "due
to developmental disabilities, traumatic brain injuries and/or
severe learning disabilities. ''425 There are thirty-three available beds
414. Id.
415. LEGIsLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.; see also Amy Forliti, Southern Minnesota Sex Offender Granted Provisional
Discharge, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.) (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.twincities
.com /localnews/ci_27076737/min nesota-sex-offender-gets-provisional-discharge.
424. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Overview, supra note 411.
425. Id.
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at Community Preparation Services and 260 available beds in St.
Peter's secure treatment facility.412
B. Current Status of Wisconsin's Sex Offender Program
In nearly twenty years, Wisconsin circuit courts civilly
committed 484 individuals. 427 As of March 2013, 352 individuals
remained civilly committed with thirty-three of those individuals on
supervised release and eight held in Wisconsin's Department of
Corrections' custody.12 The Wisconsin circuit courts have fully
discharged, as of March 31, 2013, a total of 133 individuals from
civil commitment.429 "From January 1995, when the first supervised
release placement occurred, through March 2013, circuit courts
authorized supervised release for 96 individuals who were placed
into the community."4 3 Supervised release for these individuals
43'
lasted, on average, 2.5 years. In recent years, the number of
Sexually Violent Persons (SVPs) transferred from confinement to
432
supervised release has increased.
For example, in fiscal year 2008-09, there were on average
14 SVPs on community supervised release per month. On
average, two more SVPs were awaiting placement. In fiscal
year 2011-12, the average number of SVPs on community
supervised release was 24 per month, with a monthly
average of one individual awaiting placement.43 3
Until 2009-10, the average monthly institutionalized SVP
population increased every year since the program began.
Between state fiscal years 2002-03 and 2006-07, the SVP
population grew rapidly as reflected in the increasing
numbers of referrals from DOC and the increase in the
426. Id.
427. Dep't of Health Servs., Legislative Audit Bureau, Supervised Release
Placements and Expenditures, Wis. ST. LEGISLATURE 12 (Aug. 2013), http://egis
.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/13-12full.pdf.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 15.
431. Id.
432. Grant Cummings, Wis. Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Persons, WIS. ST. LEGISLATURE 16-17 (Jan. 2013), http://legis
.wisconsin.gov/Ifb/publications/informational-papers/documents/2013/54_civil
%20commitment%20of%20 sexually%20violent%20persons.pdf.
433. Id. at 17.
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number of individuals committed to a DHS treatment
facility...."'
This increase was likely a result, at least in part, of a change in
the statutory definition of SVP.43' The definition of SVP was
broadened in 2003 by Wisconsin Act 187 "to include persons whose
mental disorder makes them 'more likely than not' to engage in an
act of sexual violence. ' 3 ' This was a departure from the prior
chapter 980 definition, which defined SVP to include persons
"whose mental disorder made them 'substantially probable' to
engage in acts of sexual violence. '' 3
"The institutionalized SVP population has been decreasing [in
Wisconsin] since 2009-10.,,43' The highest average monthly
institutionalized SVP population was 387 patients in 2008-09, but
by 2011-12, that number had decreased to 363 patients.3 9 Much of
this decrease is attributed to the introduction of the Static-99R in
2009, a risk assessment tool which replaced the previously-used
Static-99.440 The Static-99R is an actuarial assessment tool "based on
a meta-analysis of research and academic literature that has found
many individuals are less likely to re-offend than previously
thought.",41
[S]tudies have shown that the rate of sexual re-offending
in the United States has decreased substantially over the
past 10 years and that an individual's juvenile behavior is
not an accurate predictor of their likelihood to re-offend
as an adult. Research has also found that individuals are
442less likely to re-offend as they grow older.
The Static-99R accounts for this decreased risk of re-offending
by assigning lower risk to re-offend to certain offenders, specifically
to juvenile-only offenders and adult offenders over the age of
sixty. 44'
434. Id. at 15.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 15-16.
441. Id. at 16.
442. Id.
443. Id. However, this same reduction in the number of civilly committed
individuals has not been found in Minnesota.
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A person committed under Wisconsin Statutes section 980.06
must be placed in a secure mental health facility, either Sand Ridge
Secure Treatment Center (SRSTC) or Wisconsin Resource Center,
or a secure mental health unit or facility provided by the
Department of Corrections (DOC) .4 ' Currently, all individuals
committed as Sexually Violent Persons are being admitted to
SRSTC. 445 Additionally, female SVPs may be committed to the
Mendota Mental Health Institute, the Winnebago Mental Health
Institute, or any DHS-contracted privately operated residential
facility.
4 6
C. Current Status of New York's Sex Offender Program
Since the inception of SOMTA six years ago, the New York
State Office of Mental Health (OMH) has reviewed 9134 sex
offender cases to decide whether a referral to civil management is
appropriate. 4 7 The OMH referred only 560 of the 9134 cases
44 8reviewed to the Attorney General for filing and the number of
cases referred has declined almost every year since SOMTA became
law.449 However, the number of cases referred has started to
450
increase in the last year.
Of the 9134 cases reviewed by the OMH, 7902 cases were
closed without further review.4 5 ' The case review team determined
an additional 672 cases did not warrant civil management. "The
[Attorney General] has filed 560 petitions and conducted 522
444. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.065 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380,
published Apr. 25, 2014); Cummings, supra note 432, at 6.
445. See Cummings, supra note 432, at 6, 10.
446. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.065(lr) (Westlaw); Cummings, supra note 432, at
6.
447. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BUREAU, A
REPORT ON THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT TREATMENT ACT 15 (2013), availabe at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/sexualoffender/SOMB
_2013_AnnualReport.pdf.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 6, 17.
450. Id. at 6. In 2007-08, the OMH referred 134 cases to the Attorney General
for filing a civil management proceeding. In 2008-09, it referred 119 cases, while
in 2009-10 and 2010-11, it referred 65 cases each year. In 2011-12, it referred 34
cases, but it increased its referrals in 2012-13 to 99 cases. Id. at 7.
451. Id. at 7, 16.
452. Id.
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probable cause hearings." 53 In 518 of those hearings, "the courts
found probable cause to believe the individual suffered from a
mental abnormality" that required civil management.54
Since SOMTA's inception, there have been 258 civil
management trials, 146 of which were jury trials and 112 of which
were, after the offender waived his right to a jury trial, bench
trials.155 Of those trials, "the jury or judge rendered a verdict that
213 of those sex offenders suffered from a mental abnormality and
36 were adjudicated to have no mental abnormality ....
In addition to the 258 jury or bench trials, 164 individuals
subject to civil commitment have conceded that they suffer from a
mental abnormality and consented to treatment. Of these 164
individuals, ninety-five consented to treatment in a secure OMH
facility and sixty-nine of these individuals were placed on a court-
imposed regimen of strict and intensive supervision and treatment
(SIST) 5
From April 13, 2007 to March 31, 2013[,] a total of 94
sex offenders were initially placed on a regimen of SIST
after a finding that he or she suffers from a mental
abnormality.... The data suggests that if a dispositional
hearing is conducted, more offenders are found to be
dangerous sex offenders requiring confinement than are
appropriate for SIST.4 59
Civilly committed sex offenders who are found to require
confinement are currently placed in one of two secure treatment
facilities: Central New York Psychiatric Center in Marcy, New York,
or St. Lawrence Psychiatric Center in Ogdensburg, New York. 4"6
V. REFLECTIONS
Many reasons may explain Minnesota's inability to fully release
any civilly committed sex offenders during the last twenty-plus
years. However, contrasting the Minnesota statute and program
453. Id. at 19.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 20.
456. Id. At the time of the 2013 annual report, nine were pending decision. Id.
457. Id. at 21.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 23.
460. Id. at 11.
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with the same considerations in Wisconsin and New York reveals
several differences that suggest the need for changes. In no
particular order, the changes discussed below would position the
Minnesota program to correct problems of the past and bypass
those problems in the future.
A. Independent Outside Review
First, unlike Wisconsin and New York, Minnesota requires no
independent outside review of the committed patients and no
annual reporting requirements for those committed patients.46 In
other words, the Minnesota program faces no regular
accountability to the Minnesota courts by statute nor is the
program required to annually review each committed patient to
determine if that person continues to meet the commitment
criteria. Thus, while the Wisconsin and New York justice systems
keep close tabs on the programs in their respective states, the
Minnesota judicial system is by and large absent from the process
until judicial review of special review board decisions on discharge.
This lack of oversight poses several problems. First, there is no
motivation for the Minnesota program to regularly defend its
continued commitment of patients to the Minnesota courts.
Second, by failing to require annual review from an independent,
outside evaluator, the Minnesota system creates evaluation blinders.
The only evaluation of patients generally comes from within and is
subject to the same political pressures created by the state leaders
that administer, appoint, or hire the MSOP leadership. Although
there have been some outside reviews of the program by the
Minnesota State Auditor and independent consultants, this review
has been of the program itself, rather than of individuals
462committed to the program. Third, although the Minnesota
program's director has the authority to petition for release of an
individual, such petitioning authority is discretionary and not
463mandatory. In New York, by contrast, the Commissioner is
required to petition for an individual's release when that person noS •464
longer satisfies the commitment criteria. In conjunction with
annual review and/or annual reporting, this requirement would
461. Compare supra Part II.C.1, with supra Part II.C.2, and supra Part II.C.3.
462. See generally LEGISLATIvE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1.
463. See supra Part II.D. 1.
464. See supra Part II.C.3.
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force the Minnesota program to act upon knowledge or a
reasonable belief of an inappropriate commitment rather than
simply waiting for the individual to petition or leaving the
petitioning process to the discretion of the administrator.
The authors suggest three immediate changes to the
Minnesota statute: (1) independent annual review of each
committed patient, (2) annual reporting to the Minnesota courts
that includes the independent review and the program's
justification (in a legal sense) for continued commitment, and (3)
mandatory petitioning obligations imposed on the program for any
person that no longer satisfies the commitment criteria.
B. Judicial Bypass
Second, unlike Wisconsin and New York, there is no
immediate judicial bypass for a committed person to pursue
outside the normal provisional discharge or full discharge
SRB/SCAP process. The Minnesota process has proved
unworkable for several reasons. One, it is bogged down in delay
and procedural limitations. The average SRB process takes many
years and the SCAP review-although de novo-cannot consider
options not previously presented to the SRB. So, for example, if a
petition with the SRB seeks only provisional discharge, the SCAP
cannot consider a full discharge-even if the evidence warrants
such a discharge-because it was not considered by the SRB.
Compounding that problem is the lack of independent assistance
to the committed person during the SRB process. Although he or
she receives legal assistance in the SRB process and the MSOP
provides a risk assessment and treatment report to the SRB, the
availability of independent medical/psychiatric evaluators is not
available until the SCAP appeal. Thus, even if the SCAP evaluation
determines that the person no longer meets the statutory criteria
for commitment and therefore full discharge would be warranted,
the SCAP cannot consider that option if the SRB only considered
provisional discharge or transfer to Community Preparation
Services. Adding an independent judicial bypass solves this
problem and gives a committed person immediate access to the
court system along with the right to the necessary resources-
465. See supra Part II.A.
466. Rule 706 Expert Report and Recommendations at 76, Karsjens v. Jesson,
283 F.R.D. 514 (D. Minn. 2012) (No. 11-cv-03659).
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counsel and medical professionals-to assure a fair and non-biased
467process.
C. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Third, it is clear that Minnesota must immediately provide an
array of less restrictive alternatives to the current Moose Lake and
St. Peter facilities. 68 In addition to the obvious reference in the
statute itself, it is clear from the case law that depriving persons of
their liberty under civil commitment justification must be done in
the least restrictive manner. Minnesota currently has only
maximum security and CPS for patients deemed nearly ready for
reintegration into the community. Like Wisconsin and New York,
Minnesota needs facilities (or contracts with facilities) that can
provide sufficient community-based in- and out-patient sex
offender treatment for the less dangerous patients, as well as
facilities to treat mentally disabled or challenged sex offenders and
facilities to treat the medically infirm, whether caused by disease or
aging. Finally, Minnesota lacks any facility to handle female sex
offenders and must rectify that problem now as they have one
woman currently committed, and living with and being treated in
group therapy with men, which is clearly inappropriate. 9
467. Although habeas corpus petitions may on the surface seem to solve this
problem, two issues prevent these petitions from effectively serving in the place of
judicial bypass. First, in Minnesota, habeas petitions are generally limited to
constitutional violations and cannot be used for statutory violations or other claims
not premised on constitutional violations. See Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep't of Human
Servs., 798 N.W.2d 542, 547-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), affd, 825 N.W.2d 716
(Minn. 2013) (finding that habeas corpus is a remedy only for a jurisdictional
defect or a constitutional violation and "refrain [ing] from expanding the scope of
the writ of habeas corpus to encompass statutory violations that give rise to
unlawful restraint"). Normally this will not be a significant limitation because most
commitment determinations ultimately involve constitutional questions. Second,
however, there are no resources available to committed persons under the habeas
process. So they would not be entitled to counsel or medical professionals to assist
them in that process. Thus, the better course of action is to provide a judicial
bypass that contains these important protections.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102 and Part IV.A.
469. Few Options for Female Sex Offender in Minnesota, CBSNEWS (Sept. 7, 2014,
4:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/few-options-for-female-sex-offender-in
-minnesota/.
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D. Centralized Commitment Process
Fourth, the Minnesota commitment process needs to be
centralized. New York's model seems to be highly successful by
requiring competent professionals to recommend commitment
prior to the involvement of the political leaders. Minnesota's
current system of decentralized decision-making at the county level
has led to disparate outcomes based on geography. But more
importantly, by placing the decision in the hands of elected county
attorneys only, the politics of sex offender commitment cannot be
avoided. Much like independent parole boards of the past, the
decisions surrounding commitment should be made by medical
professionals and not elected officials. But like New York, including
the Attorney General, or even the county attorneys, after the initial
screening by an unbiased centralized board seems acceptable.
Adding certain additional protections to the commitment process
in Minnesota also seems warranted. Minnesota should reevaluate its
initial commitment criteria as it currently is too inclusive. Both
Wisconsin and New York require probable cause as a check against
overly zealous prosecutors, and a similar requirement in Minnesota
would add an important level ofjudicial supervision. Adding a right
to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt would further
insure against people being wrongly committed.
E. Discharge Process Overhaul
Fifth, the Minnesota discharge process is dysfunctional and in
need of complete overhaul. The SRB is understaffed, undertrained,
and lacks what the authors of this Article view as the most
important component-competent medical professionals at its
core. Even more importantly, the SRB process is flawed both by its
failure to provide professional medical resources to committed
individuals at the beginning of the process and by the inexcusable
delays built into the system.
We recommend scrapping the current process completely.
The New York model seems to provide a balanced and principled
approach to release that should be adopted in Minnesota. The
statute should require the MSOP to provide the committed
individual and his or her counsel with an annual written notice of
the right to petition the court for discharge. This is a particular fix
470. See LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-42.
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for a reoccurring problem in Minnesota where committed patients
are told (or believe, depending on the source) that they cannot be
released (and therefore there is no point in petitioning for release)
until they have finished treatment. Next, a court (and not the SRB)
should hold an evidentiary hearing as to the retention of a
committed individual if: (1) the individual has petitioned for
discharge, (2) the individual did not affirmatively waive the right to
petition, or (3) the court finds, based on the required annual
evaluation of the committed individual, that there is a substantial
issue as to whether the committed individual remains a dangerous
sex offender requiring confinement.
In addition to the annual written notice of the right to
petition, the committed individual should be able to petition the
court for discharge and/or release to the community in a less
restrictive setting at any time. Then, at the court's discretion, an
evidentiary hearing may be held, or (except in connection with
annual reviews) the court may deny an evidentiary hearing and
deny the petition upon a finding that the petition is frivolous or
does not provide sufficient basis for reexamination prior to the
next annual review. The burden of proof (by clear and convincing
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt) would always remain with
the MSOP. In keeping with any confinement that involves
dangerous individuals, there should be a provision to terminate a
less restrictive or partial release situation but only by order of the
court after a petition by the MSOP or the Attorney General.
F. Conclusion
The perfect storm hit Minnesota: a hastened enactment of
legislation after the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in the
early 1990s, and the politicization of the process in 2003 after the
horribly sad attack and murder of Dru Sjodin. These events
combined to create a culture where fear and innuendo trumped
professional judgment and the protection of constitutional rights.
As a result, the Minnesota program has failed to fully discharge a
single person, has provisionally discharged only three people and
remains mired in a cycle of committing many and releasing none.
It is time to change.
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